Hindistan'ın Savaş Doktrini: Riskleri ve Fırsatları Yeniden Değerlendirmek

Abstract

Bu makalenin amacı, Hindistan’ın Ortodoks saldırı doktrinin Hindistan’ın stratejik coğrafi konumundaki köklü değişiklikler karşısında bile ordusunu daha verimsiz bir araç haline getirdiğini ve bu bağlamda son dönemdeki Hint ordusunun inovasyon ve yenileşme hareketlerinin bu doktrin ile neden daha verimsiz olacağı değerlendirmektedir. Hindistan’ın geçmişten gelen bağlantısızlık politikasının daha küresel ölçekte yeni bir boyutunu dış politikada uyguladığı son dönemde Hindistan’ın yeni bir doktrin ile bölgesel ve küresel çıkarlarını ve gücünü daha verimli kullanılabileceğinin tartışıldığı bu makaledeki temel varsayım, Hindistan’ın mevcut askeri doktrininin son dönemdeki askeri ve stratejik işbirlikleri ve yerlileşme hareketleri ile dışa bağımlılığı azaltmayı hedeflediği dış politika izlencelerini verimli kılmayacağı ve yeni bir askeri doktrin ve vizyon geliştirilmesinin ortaya çıkaracağı riskler ve fırsatların yeni bir doktrin çerçevesinde tartışılması gerektiğidir. Bütün bu sınırlamalar ve çıkarımlar ışığında bu makale 3 bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, Hindistan’ın kara kuvvetlerini güvence altına almak üzerine geliştirdiği Ortodoks saldırı doktrini bağlamında Hindistan’ın askeri stratejisinin tarihini inceliyor. İkinci bölümde, 21.yy’da Hindistan’ın güvenlik paradigmalarını altüst eden gelişmeler ve sonrasındaki statik ortamda izlenen askeri politikaların başarısızlığı ve bu başarısızlığın nedenlerini ve sonuçlarını analiz etmektedir. Son bölüm ise, Hindistan’ın askeri gücünün mevcut doktrinde diretilmesi durumunda neden başarısız olacağı ve yeni atılımların verimlilikle sonuçlanabilmesi için oluşturulması gereken yeni modern bir askeri doktrin için bazı analizler ve çıkarımlar üzerine değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır.

Keywords

• hindistan
• savaş doktrini
• saldırı doktrini
• güvenlik çalışmaları
• askeri güvenlik

India's War Doctrine: Reassessing Risks and Opportunities

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the fact that India's orthodox offensive doctrine has made its army a more inefficient tool even in the face of radical changes in India's strategic geographical position, and in this context, why the innovation movements of the Indian army in the recent period will be more inefficient with this doctrine. The primary assumption in this article, in which it is discussed that India can use its regional and global interests and power more efficiently with a new doctrine, is the central assumption of India's current military doctrine in the recent period when India has implemented a new dimension of its non-alignment policy on a more global scale in its foreign policy. Strategic cooperation, indigenization movements, and foreign policy programs aiming to reduce foreign dependency will not make the Indian military productive. The risks and opportunities that will arise from developing a new military doctrine and vision should be discussed within the framework of a new doctrine. Considering all these limitations and inferences, this article consists of three parts. The first chapter examines the history of India's military strategy in the context of India's orthodox doctrine of aggression to secure its ground forces. In the second part, the developments that overturned the security paradigms of India in the 21st century and the failure of the military policies followed in the static environment afterwards, and the causes and consequences of this failure are analyzed. In the last part, some analyzes and implications are made for why India's military power will fail if it insists on the current doctrine and for a new modern military doctrine that should be created so that breakthroughs can result in efficiency.

Keywords

• india
• war doctrine
• offensive doctrine
• security studies
• military security

References

1. Ahmed, A. (2012). India’s limited war doctrine: The structural factor. Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses.
2. Babar, S. I., & Mirza, M. N. (2021). Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory. Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses, 6(2), 79-100.
3. Bhardwaj, D. (2018, Mayıs 7). “Make in India” in defence sector: A distant dream. ORF. Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-dream/.
4. Chari, P. R., Cheema, P. I., & Cohen, S. P. (2007). Four crises and a peace process: American engagement in South Asia. Brookings Institution Press.
5. Clary, C. (2018). Personalities, organizations, and doctrine in the Indian military. India Review, 17(1), 100-121. Erişim Tarihi: 16.10.2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415283.
6. Connable, B., Campbell, J. H., & Madden, D. (2016). Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War. RAND Corporation.
7. Defence Manufacturing | Make In India. (t.y.). Erişim Tarihi: 29.09.2022, https://www.makeinindia.com/sector/defence-manufacturing.
8. Hagerty, D. T. (1991). India’s Regional Security Doctrine. Asian Survey, 31(4), 351-363. Erişim Tarihi: 16.10.2022, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645389.

9. Hilali, A. Z. (2001). India’s Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy. Asian Survey, 41(5), 737-764. Erişim Tarihi: 16.10.2022, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.5.737.
10. Kalyani Rafael JV begins MRSAM missile kits delivery to armed forces. (2021, Mart 16). The Hindu. Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/kalyani-rafael-jv-begins-mrsam-missile-kits-delivery-to-armed-forces/article34086468.ece.
11. Ladwig III, W. C. (2007). A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine. International Security, 32(3), 158-190.
12. Lalwani, S., O’donnell, F., Sagerstrom, T., & Vasudeva, A. (2021). The Influence of Arms: Explaining the Durability of India–Russia Alignment • Stimson Center. Erişim Tarihi: 29.10.2022, https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-influence-of-arms-explaining-the-durability-of-india-russia-alignment/
13. Lintner, B. (2018). China’s India war: Collision course on the roof of the world (First edition). Oxford University Press.
14. Luis, A. (2021). China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win. Erişim Tarihi: 18.10.2022, https://www.audible.com/pd/China-Military-Power-Modernizing-a-Force-to-Fight-and-Win-Audiobook/B09BP3WMRG
15. Mansingh, S. (1984). India’s search for power: Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy, 1966-1982. Sage Publications.
16. Maxwell, N. (2015). India’s China war (Revised and updated Indian paperback edition). Natraj Publishers.
17. Moitra, M., & Chatterjee, A. (2022). National Security and Privacy: Which Side Well The Debate move? Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law, 2(2), 1-9.
18. Mukherjee, A. (2020). The absent dialogue: Politicians, bureaucrats, and the military in India. Oxford University Press.
19. Mukherjee, A. (2022). Towards control and effectiveness: The Ministry of Defence and civil-military relations in India. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-23. Erişim Tarihi: 16.10.2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2118115
20. O’Hanlon, M. E. (2019). The Senkaku paradox: Risking great power war over small stakes (First edition). Brookings Institution Press.
21. Palka, E. J., & Galgano, F. A. (2005). Military geography: From peace to war. McGraw Hill Custom Publishing.
22. Pandit, R. (2020, Mayıs 10). CDS Bipin Rawat: Forces must shun imports, go for ‘Make In India’, says Gen Bipin Rawat | India News—Times of India. Erişim Tarihi: 29.10.2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/forces-must-shun-imports-go-for-make-in-india-says-gen-bipin-rawat/articleshow/75652962.cms
23. PIB Delhi. (2022). Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan visits forward posts in Rajouri sector of Jammu & Kashmir; Reviews security scenario & operational preparedness along LoC. Erişim Tarihi: 18.10.2022, https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1870628
24. Rathi, N., Aggarwal, B., & Pandey, H. K. (2019). Make in India Challenges in Defence Sector (SSRN Scholarly Paper Sy 3998482). Erişim Tarihi: 29.10.2022 https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3998482
25. Romjue, J. L. (1984). From active defense to AirLand Battle: The development of Army doctrine, 1973-1982. University of California Libraries.
26. S. Jayaraman, K. (2020). The inside story of India’s Light Combat Aircraft Tejas. Nature India. Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2022, https://doi.org/10.1038/nindia.2020.33
27. Shaikh, A., Kinange, U., & Fernandes, A. (2016). Make in India: Oportunities and Challenges in Defence Sector. International Journal of Research in Commerce & Management, 7(2), 13-16.
28. Sharma, M. (2022). Indian Military Dependence on Russia. Institut Montaigne. Erişim Tarihi: 28.10.2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/indian-military-dependence-russia
29. Shivane, A. B. (2021). Restructuring for India’s Disputed Borders: An Appraisal. CLAWS Journal, 14(2), 46-61.
30. Shwkatkar Committee. (2018). Recommendations made by Shekatkar Committee. Press Information Bureau. Erişim Tarihi: 29.10.2022, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=177071
31. Singh, C. H. V. (2022, Eylül 22). Evolution of Warfighting Strategy in India. Erişim Tarihi: 30.10.2022 https://www.claws.in/evolution-of-warfighting-strategy-in-india/
32. Singh, P. K. (2016). Changing contexts of Chinese military strategy and doctrine. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
33. Smith, C. (1994). India’s ad hoc arsenal: Arms procurement in historical perspective. Oxford University Press.
34. Tarapore, A. (2020). The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance (s. 4) [Working Paper]. Carnegie India. Erişim Tarihi: 17.10.2022, https://carnegieindia.org/2020/08/10/army-in-indian-military-strategy-rethink-doctrine-or-risk-irrelevance-pub-82426
35. Wezeman, P. D., Kuimova, A., & Wezeman, S. T. /SIPRI. (t.y.). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021. 12.
36. Yadav, D. S. M. (2021, Mayıs 21). An Assessment of India’s Land Warfare Doctrine. Erişim Tarihi: 30.10.2022, https://www.claws.in/an-assessment-of-indias-land-warfare-doctrine/