SAVAŞ RASYONEL BİR DÜELLODAN MI İBARETTİR? SAVAŞIN PAZARLIK MODELİ’NE BİR ELEŞTİRİ

Year 2020, Volume: 9 Issue: 2, 459 - 478, 23.11.2020

Sevinç Öztürk

https://doi.org/10.28956/gbd.830025

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Pazarlık Modeli her ne kadar son yıllarda uluslararası ilişkiler ve savaş literatüründe ilerlemeci, analitik ve ikna edici bir açıklama sağlasa da modelin bazı eksiklikleri ve zayıflıkları bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Savaşın Pazarlık Modeli’nin ve onun uygulamalarının güçlü ve zayıf olduğu yönler tartışılacaktır. Çalışmada, özellikle, Savaşın Pazarlık Modeli’nin ortaya çıkışı, onun nedensellik mekanizması bu modelin güncel uygulamalarına odaklanarak örnekler üzerinden incelenmektedir. Bu incelemeye ¬¬dayanarak bu çalışma, teorinin savaşın nedenleri konusunda önemli ölçüde açıklamalar yapmasına rağmen teorinin mekanizmalarının mantıksallığında, özellikle de uyuşmazlık problemi, belirsizlik, “ister kabul et, ister etme” protokolü, rasyonalite ve riskten kaçınma konularında bazı eksiklikleri olduğunu savunur. Savaşın Pazarlık Modeli savaşın nedenleri konusunda hala gelişmekte bir teori olmakla beraber, açıklamaları bize ikna edici, fakat aynı zamanda kısıtlı ve kısmen yanıltıcı bir nedensellik sunmaktadır. Savaşın nedenine yönelik psikolojik ve iç politikaya dayalı açıklamalardan da faydanlanmak, teorinin açıklayıcı gücünü daha da arttırabilecek ve yanıltıcı açıklamaların önüne geçebilecektir.

Keywords

Pazarlık, Savaş, Eksik Bilgi, Taahhüt Sorunu, Çatışma

IS IT ALL ABOUT A RATIONAL DUEL? A CRITIQUE OF BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR

Abstract

The bargaining model has emerged as a progressive, analytic, and persuasive explanation of war; yet, it has some limitations and weaknesses that need improvement. In this study, the potential strength and weaknesses of the bargaining model of war, as well as its applications are discussed. More specifically, this paper reviews the emergence, causal mechanisms, and modifications of the bargaining model of war by concentrating on its up-to-date applications to war. This paper argues that bargaining model gives us a conspicuous explanation concerning the war, even though the theory suffers from some deficits; particularly on the logic of its mechanism, the problem of disagreement, uncertainty, “take it or leave it” protocol, rationality and risk aversion of the actor. The bargaining model of war is still progressing; nonetheless, these problems allow us to have a persuasive but limited and even partially misleading explanation of war. Benefiting from the psychological and domestic explanations of war, the explanatory power of the theory might be enhanced.

Keywords

Bargaining, War, Incomplete Information, Commitment Problem, Conflict

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