INSTITUTIONALIZED ELECTORAL FAIRNESS AND GOVERNMENT QUALITY

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 2, 1 - 12, 30.12.2022

Seçkin Yıldırım

Öz

Bu makale, demokrasiler arasındaki seçim adaleti farklılıklarının hükumet kalitesi farklılıklarını açıklayabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Parlamento seçimlerindeki kurumsallaşmış adaletsizlikler iktidarların kendi performans düşüklüklerine dair algıladıkları siyasal maliyetleri düşürmektedir. İktidarlar, formal ve informal siyasal kurumların gelecek seçimlerin manipülasyonuna izin verdiğinin farkında olmaları durumunda oylarını arttırıcı politikalara daha az yatırım yapmakta ve bu durum, toplum adına beklenenin altında ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal sonuçlara yol açmaktadır. Bu çalışma, seçim adaletini ölçmek için sade fakat özgün bir yöntem önermekte ve bu yöntem ile 1998-2017 yılları arası için 34 Avrupa ülkesinde seçim adaleti ile hükumet kalitesi arasındaki ilişkiyi ampirik olarak incelemektedir. Çalışmanın bulguları, kurumsallaşmış seçim adaleti ile hükumet kalitesi arasında, seçimlerin daha az adaletli olduğu ülkelerin daha kötü yönetildikleri sonucunu gösteren, istatistiki olarak anlamlı bir ilişkiye işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Electoral fairness, government quality, institutional economics, Electoral fairness, government quality, institutional economics

INSTITUTIONALIZED ELECTORAL FAIRNESS AND GOVERNMENT QUALITY1

Öz

This paper proposes that differences in fairness of elections between democracies can explain differences in government quality. Institutionalized unfairness in parliamentary elections decreases incumbents’ perceived political costs of underperforming in democracies. When incumbents are aware that formal and informal political institutions allow manipulation of upcoming elections to maximize chances of winning, they can invest less in policies normally expected to win them votes, resulting in below-par economic, political and social outcomes for the society. I propose a simple yet novel measure of electoral fairness and test it against governments’ average regulatory quality for 34 European countries between 1998-2017. The findings suggest a significant relationship between institutionalized electoral fairness and government quality, implying that countries with unfairer elections are governed less efficiently.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Electoral fairness, government quality, institutional economics

Kaynakça

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