FISCAL REFORMS of STATES in CANADA

Abstract

Hükümetin sermaye fazlası bağlamında 1990’ların sonlarından itibaren Kanada, aktif olarak vergi reformlarını destekleyerek vergileri indirmektedir. Günümüzde birçok Kanadalının borçlanma faiz oranlarının kabul edilemez olduğunu düşünmeleri nedeniyle yerel hükümetlerin tamamı finansal-mali zorluklarla karşı karşıyadırlar. Bu çalışma, sadece ekonomik faktörlere bağlı olarak gerek federal gerekse yerel hükümetlerin ekonomik rollerini yeniden inşa etmek için önerilen iki yaklaşıma odaklanmaktadır. Diğer bir ifade ile söz konusu önerilerle hükümetlerin ilk iki seviyesinde görülen gelir dağılımı problemlerine çözüm üretilmesine çalışılmaktadır. İlk öneri oldukça merkezidir, çünkü kaynakların federal hükümete aktarılmadan önce eyalet yönetimlerinin finansal açıklarını kapatmaya yöneliktir. İkinci öneri ise ilkinin tersi bir yapıda olup; verginin, vergilendirme gücünün bölümlendirilmesi ve dikey finansal boşluğun ortadan kaldırılması konularında yani kendi vergi hareketlerini yönetme noktasında eyalet yönetimlerine çok daha fazla bağımsızlık vermektedir

Keywords

• Mali reform,Kanada,Yerel hükümet,Merkezileşme

FISCAL REFORMS of STATES in CANADA

Abstract

Canada has long-been a supporter of tax reform and actively cutting taxes since the late 90s, in a context of government surpluses. Today, all governments have a large fiscal challenge as they are accumulating debt at a rate that most Canadians consider unacceptable. This paper focuses on two recent proposals for restructuring of federal-provincial economic roles, both based on purely economic factors. In other words, the two proposals we studied were made to solve the current problems resulting from poor distribution of revenues between the first two levels of government. One is very centralized, based on the bailout of deficit provincial governments, before they give in return virtually all economic stabilization powers to the federal government. The other proposal is diametrically opposed because the new division of taxation powers and taxation and the elimination of vertical fiscal gap it plans would allow provincial governments to become much more independent in the conduct of their tax affairs

Keywords

• Fiscal reform,Canada,Provincial government,Centralized

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