RETHINKING AGENCY THEORY IN COMPANIES WITH CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

Year 2017, Volume: 9 Issue: 1, 80 - 91, 01.02.2017

İrem Tore

Abstract

This article aims to provide a commentary on the need of alternative theories on
corporate governance in companies with concentrated ownership with the aim to
identify the gap in this field. The main argument of the article is that concentrated
ownerhip gives rise to agency problems when a manager who has superior
information acts on behalf of a group of shareholders and neglecting the others.
Thus, this kind of agency conflicts require different solutions from conflicts that
appear in dispersed ownership. Since the agency conflicts in concentrated
ownership renders the assumption that concentrated ownership reduces agency
conflicts ineffective, it is neccessary to employ alternative theories to better
understand agency conflicts in these companies.

Keywords

Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, Concentrated Ownership