A NEW E-GOVERNMENT ROLE IN IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: A STUDY BASED ON A YARDSTICK COMPETITION MODEL

Year 2012, Volume: 4 Issue: 2, 91 - 101, 01.12.2012

Yasuyuki Nishigaki Yuzo Higashi Wong Meng Seng Hideki Nishimoto

Abstract

In this paper, we present a new e-government role in improving local government performance, following an investigation based on a yardstick competition model into the theoretical and empirical importance of local governments delivering policy information and understanding the residents’ preferences for public goods and services through e-government. We investigate the efficiency of a yardstick competitive equilibrium and, for empirical significance, present the estimated results of a yardstick competition and voting behavior functions, introducing new elements for evaluating e-government

Keywords

E-government, Yardstick Competition Model, Policy Evaluation and E-government Evaluation

References

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