FACTORS DETERMINING TAXPAYERS’ PERCEPTION TOWARDS TAX FAIRNESS: THE STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL FOR TURKEY

Year 2015, Volume: 7 Issue: 1, 17 - 38, 01.06.2015

Filiz Giray Adnan Gerçek Cansu Aydoğdu

Abstract

Tax noncompliance is a significant problem that should be researched given changing tax views of taxes. Tax compliance is a complex issue and can be explained by both economic and social factors. Perceptions of fairness have played an important role in taxpayers’ voluntary tax compliance. This exploratory study investigated the relationship between tax compliance and fairness from the point of view of taxpayers’ perception of tax fairness and the factors determining tax fairness. Using survey data collected from 481 taxpayers, this relationship was found using a structural equation model with Turkey as the sample country. We found that perceived fairness in the tax system depends on the structure of the tax system, interaction with the tax administration, inefficiency in the tax system, tax morale and the using of public expenditures

Keywords

Tax compliance, tax fairness, taxpayers’ perceptions, tax knowledge, structural equation model

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