Integrated analysis of nuclear safety, security and physical protection systems: A comparative evaluation of nuclear terrorism risks

Abstract

This study examines nuclear safety and nuclear security within an integrated framework, systematically analysing the functional distinctions and common denominators of these fields. The design processes of physical protection systems (PPS), layered defence architecture, domestically developed analytical software tools and risk assessment models are evaluated through a literature synthesis methodology. The contributions of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), the threat–vulnerability–consequence (TVC) model and machine-learning-assisted surveillance systems to integrated security are discussed. The second focal axis of the study is the nuclear terrorism threat and internationally developed prevention strategies against it. The findings demonstrate that not only technical measures, but also a robust security culture, international coordination and institutional transparency are indispensable for establishing nuclear stability. The results are further supported by an assessment of Turkey's nuclear security policy through the lens of the Akkuyu NPP case.

Keywords

• Nuclear safety
• Nuclear security
• Physical protection system
• Nuclear terrorism
• Defence-in-depth

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