A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe

Emre Murat Ercan; Ali Aydin Selçuk

A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe

Abstract

One of the best-known cyber attacks, distributed denial of service DDoS , is evolving. It has become much more malefic and effective with the use of amplification power of reflected messages. This attack is known as the distributed reflected denial of service DRDoS or the amplification attack. Attackers abuse UDP-based protocols' connectionless property for this attack and achieve an attack volume of hundreds of Gbps. The attack occurs by botnets' spoofing a victim's IP address and demanding some service from unhardened servers. Attackers generally prefer protocols that have high a "amplification factor" such as NTP and Memcached, or protocols where it is hard to differentiate legal requests from malicious ones, such as DNS. At this point, an important defensive strategy against these attacks is to harden servers not to play a role as amplifiers. In this paper, we carried out a detailed research of servers in 41 European countries and focused on three UDP-based protocols most commonly abused by attackers: DNS, NTP, and Memcached. We searched these servers by automatic regional scans and analyzed whether they have been hardened against DRDoS attacks.

Keywords

—Denial of service, DRDoS attacks, DNS, NTP, Memcached

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Details

Primary Language

English

Subjects

-

Journal Section

-

Authors

Emre Murat Ercan This is me

Ali Aydin Selçuk This is me

Publication Date

June 1, 2021

Submission Date

-

Acceptance Date

-

Published in Issue

Year 2021 Volume: 10 Number: 2

IZ

https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX

Cite

RIS / Bibtex

APA

Ercan, E. M., & Selçuk, A. A. (2021). A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe. International Journal of Information Security Science, 10(2), 26-41. https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX

AMA

1.Ercan EM, Selçuk AA. A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe. IJISS. 2021;10(2):26-41. https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX

Chicago

Ercan, Emre Murat, and Ali Aydin Selçuk. 2021. “A Study on Exploitable DRDoS Amplifiers in Europe”. International Journal of Information Security Science 10 (2): 26-41. https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX.

EndNote

Ercan EM, Selçuk AA (June 1, 2021) A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe. International Journal of Information Security Science 10 2 26–41.

IEEE

[1]E. M. Ercan and A. A. Selçuk, “A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe”, IJISS, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 26–41, June 2021, [Online]. Available: https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX

ISNAD

Ercan, Emre Murat - Selçuk, Ali Aydin. “A Study on Exploitable DRDoS Amplifiers in Europe”. International Journal of Information Security Science 10/2 (June 1, 2021): 26-41. https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX.

JAMA

1.Ercan EM, Selçuk AA. A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe. IJISS. 2021;10:26–41.

MLA

Ercan, Emre Murat, and Ali Aydin Selçuk. “A Study on Exploitable DRDoS Amplifiers in Europe”. International Journal of Information Security Science, vol. 10, no. 2, June 2021, pp. 26-41, https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX.

Vancouver

1.Emre Murat Ercan, Ali Aydin Selçuk. A study on exploitable DRDoS amplifiers in Europe. IJISS [Internet]. 2021 Jun. 1;10(2):26-41. Available from: https://izlik.org/JA67PC53XX