Factors Affecting The Use Of WTO Fiscal Protection Instruments

Year 2021, , 97 - 114, 30.06.2021

Göksel Karaş

https://doi.org/10.30927/ijpf.909348

Abstract

Many countries, especially developed countries, have been trying to liberalize international trade for many years. Although it is intended to liberalize international trade, countries do not hesitate to use protection policy instruments. Within the means of protectionism, fiscally protection instruments are the most popular instruments, consisting of anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards, following the invisible obstacles. This article examines the macroeconomic factors affecting the use of fiscally protection instruments for country groups and each country through the negative binomial regression analysis between the years 1995-2016. As a result of the analysis, only the real exchange rate affected the use of fiscally protection instruments in high-income countries, while the growth rate, real exchange rate, and unemployment rate affect the low and middle-income countries. This shows that high-income countries do not use fiscal protection instruments fairly, and the low and middle-income countries act with completing their economic development and macroeconomic concerns.

Keywords

Fiscally Protection Instruments, Negative Binomial Regression, WTO

References

• Aggarwal, A. (2004). “Macroeconomic determinants of antidumping: A comparative analysis of developed and developing countries”, World Development, 32(6), 1043–1057.
• Bagchi, S., Bhattacharyya, S. & Narayanan, K. (2015). “Anti-dumping initiations in Indian manufacturing industries”, South Asia Economic Journal, 16(2), 278–294.
• Blonigen, B. A. (2005). “The effects of NAFTA on antidumping and countervailing duty activity”, World Bank Economic Review, 19(3), 407–424.
• Bown, C. P. (2008). “The WTO and antidumping in developing countries”, Economics and Politics, 20(2), 255–288.
• Choi, C. H. & Kim, J. W. (2014). “Determinants for Macroeconomic Factors of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of India and China”, International Trade Journal, 28(3), 229–245.
• Desai, P. & Feinberg, R. M. (2019). “Are US antidumping cases being crowded out by other forms of protectionism?”, Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, 19(1), 1-7.
• Egger, P. & Nelson, D. (2011). “How Bad Is Antidumping? Evidence From Panel Data”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4), 1374–1390.
• Engin, N. (1992). Uluslararası Ticarette Korumacı Eğilimler, İstanbul Ticaret Odası, İstanbul.
• Feinberg, R. M. (1989). “Exchange Rates and "Unfair Trade"”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(4), 704–707.
• Feinberg, R. M. (2004). “U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators: What Do Petitioners Expect, and Are They Correct?”, Department of Economics, American University, Washington, DC., 20016–8029 (2007), 1–16. Available at: http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers (03.04.2018)
• Feinberg, R. M. (2005). “U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indıcators Revisited: Do Petitioners Learn?”, Review of World Economics, 141(4), 612-622.
• Finger, B. J. M., Hall, H. K. & Nelson, D. R. (1982). “The Political Economy of Administered Protection”, The American Economic Review, 72(3), 452–466.
• Gbakou, P. M., Jallab, M. S. & Sandretto, R. (2007). “Antidumping Procedures and Macroeconomic Factors : A Comparison between the United States and the European Union”, Global Economy Journal, 6(3), 1-28.
• Hallworth, T. & Piracha, M. (2006). “Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from a New Generation of Protectionist Countries”, Journal of World Trade, 40(3), 407–423.
• Hausman, J. (1978). “Speficitation Test in Econometrics”, Econometrica, 46(6), 1251-1272.
• Irwin, D. A. (2005). “The rise of US anti-dumping activity in historical perspective”, World Economy, 28(5), 651–668.
• Jallab, M. S., Gbakou, P. M. & Sandretto, R. (2009). “Antidumping Procedures and Macroeconomic Factors: A Comparison Between The United States and The European Union”, Global Economy Journey, 3, 1-28.
• Knetter, M. M. & Prusa, T. J. (2003). “Macroeconomic Factors and antidumping filings: Evidence from four countries”, Journal of International Economics, 61(1), 1–17.
• Leidy, M. P. (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions And Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States”, Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund, 44(1), 132–144.
• Li, R. (2018). “The Research on Factors Which Affect Anti-dumping Investigation: Based on Probit Model”, International Journal of Business and Management, 13(3), 252-261.
• Liu, Y. & Deng, J. (2016). “Antidumping Under International Fragmentation: Evidence from China”, Review of Development Economics, 20(1), 306-316.
• Mah, J. S. & Kim, Y. D. (2006). “Antidumping duties and macroeconomic variables: The case of Korea”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 28(2), 157–162.
• Moore, M. & Zanardi, M. (2009). “Does antidumping use contribute to trade liberalization in developing countries?”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(2), 469–495.
• Moore, M. & Zanardi, M. (2011). “Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?”, Review of Development Economics, 15(4), 601–619.
• Özer, H. & Erkal, G. (2016). “Türkiye’nin Antidamping Uygulamalarının Ekonometrik Analizi”, Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 30(2), 441-454.
• Selen, U. (2020). “Why do countries use temporary trade barriers?”, Applied Economic Letters, 27(6), 437-440.
• Tabakis, C. & Zanardi, M. (2019). “Preferential trade agreements and antidumping protection”, Journal of International Economics, 121(2019), 1-15.
• Wang, X. (2016). “What Factors Motivate Foreign Countries to Initiate an Antidumping Investigation against China?”, The Regional Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL), REAL 16-T-3, 1-17.
• Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach Second Edition, South-Western College Publication, Cincinnati.
• World Bank. (2018). Available at: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (12.12.2018).
• World Trade Organization. (2019). Available at: https://www.wto.org (04.04.2018).
• Zeng, K. (2011). “The political economy of developing country antidumping investigations against China”, International Interactions, 37(2), 190–214.
• Zhou, W. & Cuyvers, L. (2009). “Determinants of EU antidumping actions against East Asian countries”, Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, 8(3), 291–305.