Homoeconomicus: the ultimate representative of rational economic behavior

Year 2019, , 63 - 68, 01.01.2019

Gelengül Koçaslan

https://doi.org/10.24289/ijsser.494670

Abstract

Homoeconomicus is the top
player of economics. Economic theoretical insights, models, approaches and frameworks
are built upon homoeconomicus also known as economic human. In order to act consistent
with the theory and not to violate its basic tenets, homoeconomicus is equipped
with some spesific characteristic properties. Homoeconomicus is designed as an
unemotional, selfish, rational utility maximizer. In other words homoeconomicus
was born as a perfect representative of the theory. So it is a dual structure both
supports each other. This research aims to better understand homoeconomicus and
why and how homoeconomicus fails in real economic life.

Keywords

Homoeconomicus, rationality, irrationality

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