HEURISTIC MODEL OF TAXPAYER BEHAVIOUR: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Abstract

The article concerns with the subject of studying economic behavior of taxpayers with application of agent-based and heuristic approach. It provides possibility to simulate changes in the shadow sector of economy based on evaluation of probable irrational response by economic agents to potential changes in the tax, financial and economic policies with regard to interaction between agents. The methodology and particularities of approaches implementation are described in the article

Keywords

• Heuristics, Taxpayer, Economic behaviour, Bounding rationality

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