The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Losers and Winners

Abstract

The legal status of the Caspian Sea has led to one of the biggest debates since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After a long period of time, with numerous joint and bilateral meetings, this international crisis ended in 2018 as a result of the signing of a document called the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (CLSCS). In this article, the winning and losing sides amongst the signatories of the CLSCS were attempted to be determined by taking into account the new de facto situation in the Caspian basin in light of the geopolitical developments since 2018, through an analysis of economic, political, and legal consequences of the convention. This topic was examined through consideration of the motives behind the signatories' political actions, political connections, and the historical context. The articles of CLSCS, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (also known as the Middle Corridor) and The Organization of Turkic States were analyzed in order to determine the various consequences of the CLSCS. In the conclusion of the article, the signatory countries of Russia and Iran were placed on the losing side, whereas the signatory countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were stated to be on the winning side of the CLSCS.

Keywords

• Azerbaijan
• Caspian Sea
• Iran
• Kazakhstan
• Legal Status of the Caspian Sea
• Russia
• Turkmenistan

Hazar Denizi'nin Hukuki Statüsüne Dair Sözleşme: Kaybedenler ve Kazananlar

Öz

Hazar Denizi'nin hukuki statüsü, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonraki en büyük tartışmalardan birisine yol açmıştır. Uzun bir zamana yayılan, çok sayıda ortak ve ikili görüşmelerin ardından bu uluslararası kriz, Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (CLSCS) adlı bir belgenin imzalanmasıyla 2018 yılında son bulmuştur. Bu yazıda, 2018 yılından sonraki jeopolitik gelişmeler ışığında Hazar havzasında oluşan yeni fiili durum dikkate alınmak suretiyle, CLSCS’nin ekonomik, politik ve hukuki sonuçlarının analizi üzerinden kazanan ve kaybeden taraflar belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu konu, imzalayan tarafların politik tutumlarının arkasındaki niyetler, politik bağlantılar ve tarihi bağlamlar göz önünde bulundurularak incelenmiştir. CLSCS’nin çeşitli sonuçlarını belirlemek amacıyla sözleşmenin maddeleri, Trans-Hazar Uluslararası Taşımacılık Koridoru (Orta Koridor olarak da bilinen) ve Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı analiz edilmiştir. Makalenin sonuç kısmında, imzalayan ülkeler arasından Rusya ve İran kaybeden tarafa yerleştirilirken, Azerbaycan, Kazakistan ve Türkmenistan'ın CLSCS’nin kazanan tarafında olduğu belirtilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Azerbaycan
• Hazar Denizi
• İran
• Kazakistan
• Hazar Denizi'nin hukuki statüsü
• Rusya
• Türkmenistan

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