Abstract

Şirketlerin mevcut pay sahiplerinin ve muhtemel yatırımcılarının, şirket finansal mali durum tablolarına bilinçli ve tam olarak güvenmelerine hizmet eden, ‘şirketlerin yıllık hesap denetçilerinin tam bağımsızlığının gerekliliği’ hususu bu makalenin konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma, şirketleri denetleyen denetim şirketlerinin sübjektif ve haksız bir şekilde şirketler lehine tutum almasına neden olan muhtelif saikleri ortaya koymakta ve dolayısıyla bu yanlı tutumun yatırımcılar ile pay sahipleri ve kamu bakımından teşkil ettiği risklerin niteliğini açıklamaktadır. Makale bu riskleri azaltmak için Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde ve Avrupa’da kabul edilmiş çeşitli yasal düzenlemeleri incelemekte ve bu düzenlemelerin şirket denetçilerinin bağımsızlığını sağlayıp sağlayamadığını değerlendirmektedir.

Keywords

• Denetçi
• denetçi bağımsızlığı
• denetçilerin kurumsal yönetimdeki rolü
• bağımsız denetim düzenlemeleri

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE NEW AUDIT REGULATIONS IN THE EU

Abstract

The subject of this article is the need for total independence of the auditors of annual company accounts, so that the companies’ investors and shareholders, actual and potential, can place informed and well-founded trust in its official financial statements. This study sets out the various incentives a hired firm of auditors may have for adopting a subjective and unduly favourable stance towards its employers and explains the nature of the risks thereby entailed to the company’s investors and shareholders, and indeed to the wider general public. It analyses the various legislative safeguards already adopted and the formal recommendations or proposed directives, made by the EU and US legislatures in recent years, to minimise or eliminate such risks, and assesses whether these regulations could ensure auditor independence.

Keywords

• auditor
• auditor independence
• the role of auditors in corporate governance
• audit regulations

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