In this article, my analysis will show that
Avicenna’s doctrine of “the second intelligibles” was posited as a response to
an ongoing debate about the relationship between logic and grammar. Apparently,
the logician and philosopher al-Mattā’s (d. 328/940) defense of logic against
the grammarian al-Sīrāfī
(d. 365/977) in the debate on the subject, which emerged one generation prior
to Avicenna, did not satisfy the subsequent members of Baghdād’s philosophy school. After this
debate, the prominent members of this school, such as al-Fārābī (d. 338/950), Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d.
362/974), Abū Sulaymān
al-Sijistānī (d. c.
380/991) and Abū al-Faraj
Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d.
435/1044), introduced new arguments to this debate that strengthened the
position of logicians against grammarians. They clarified the position of logic
as they asserted that the subject matter of logic is distinct from that of
grammar. To achieve this, the logicians of the Baghdād school pointed to the difference between logicians and grammarians in
dealing with vocal forms, indicating that logicians deal with “the universal
meanings and the expressions insofar as they signify universal meanings.” This
is contrary to the grammarians who are concerned with the expressions without
focusing on their universal meanings.
It appears that al-Fārābī and his pupil Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī devoted extra effort to
elaborating upon their approaches regarding the distinctness of logic from
grammar. In his distinctive work on the classification of sciences, Ihṣā’ al-‘ulūm, al-Fārābī accords grammar and the other linguistic sciences a special place in
his system. Furthermore, he meticulously separates logic and language in terms
of their subject matters when considering the relationship between them.
Following a similar line of thought, his pupil Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī penned a
special treatise on the differentiation of logic and grammar, titled, al-Faṣl bayna ṣinā‘atay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa’l-naḥw al-‘Arabī. In this work, he defines both disciplines in
terms of their purposes and subject matters and then argues that logic, unlike
grammar, examines universal meanings and their vocal forms; however, it does
not deal with vocal forms in a similar manner to grammar. For Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, logic and grammar are different disciplines because their subject
matters are distinct. Still, vocal forms or expressions remain the subject
matter of logic in their works. Even the last member of logicians of the Baghdād school, Abū’l-Faraj Ibn al-Ṭayyib, says in his commentary on
Porphyry’s Isagoge that “the subject matter of the art of logic is the
simple vocal forms which refer to common ideas (al-ṣuwar al-‘āmmah)”. The Baghdād school claims that language is inadequate to
deal with the reality whereas logic adequately shows what is true and false in
the theoretical domain and what is good and bad in the practical. Among the
members of the Baghdād
school, al-Fārābī is the logician who expressed his
opinion on the subject matter of logic in a manner closest to Avicenna. In his Book
of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf), which is one of his most
important works concerning the philosophy of language, al-Fārābī posits that the “first intelligible meanings”
is the subject matter of logic. Moreover, he mentions the “second
intelligibles” and uses it as a technical term, linking it to the subject
matter of logic prior to Avicenna. Contrary to Avicenna’s works, in al-Fārābī’s Book of Letters, “the vocal forms”
appears as the subject matter of logic. Al-Fārābī considers “the first intelligibles” as the focus of all
sciences—political sciences, natural sciences, mathematics, metaphysics and
logic. However, he stresses that logic is also interested in the vocal forms of
“the first intelligibles” whereas the other sciences disregard the vocal forms.
The Fārābian doctrine continues to examine
the vocal forms and for this reason Avicenna criticizes al-Fārābī and the other members of the Baghdād school.
Avicenna was also interested in the question of
the subject matter of logic. However, as opposed to al-Fārābī and the other
members of the Baghdād school, he was dissatisfied with identifying the
subject matter of logic with their vocal utterances. He, therefore, criticized
his predecessors’ position on this problem. For him, meanings, apart from their
vocal utterances, must be considered as the subject matter of logic. In the
introductory part of al-Madkhal of al-Shifā’, Avicenna objects
to logicians who argued that the logician qua logician should be concerned with
vocal forms. This might be read as a contrasted view and a criticism of
al-Fārābī and the Baghdād school. Avicenna was concerned with the
relationships among mental contents rather than the ones between the mental
content and vocal form. Therefore, he articulates that the subject matter of
logic is the second intelligibles, which is based on the first intelligibles.
He did not consider the first intelligibles or their vocal forms as the subject
matter of logic. Rather, he asserts that since “the second intelligibles” are
the meanings abstracted from the meanings in mind, i.e. the first
intelligibles, they are the things that are more suitable for the subject
matter of logic. In my view, Avicenna’s doctrine of the “second intelligibles”
provided him with a profound instrument in introducing the notion of “the
separation of logic from grammar in terms of the subject matter”. This article
surveys Avicenna’s doctrine of “the second intelligibles”, accounting for his
critique of his predecessors and understanding this doctrine as a response to
the debate of logic and language.
Second intelligibles logic-language vocal forms Abū Bishr al-Mattā al-Sīrāfī Baghdād Philosophy School Avicenna
Bu makale İbn Sînâ’nın “ikinci makuller”
görüşünün kendinden önce süregelen dil-mantık tartışmasına bir cevap olarak
geliştirildiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. İbn Sînâ’nın yaşadığı asırdan bir
asır önce Bağdat felsefe okulunu kuran mantıkçılarından biri olarak Ebû Bişr
Mettâ’nın (ö. 328/940) dilci Sîrâfî ile (ö. 365/977) girdiği tartışmadaki
durumu okulun sonraki mensuplarını tatmin etmemiş gözükmektedir. Bu yüzden
Mettâ’nın doğrudan öğrencileri olan Fârâbî (ö. 338/950) ve Yahyâ b. Adî (ö.
362/974) gibi okulun sonraki mensupları bu tartışmaya yönelik yeni cevaplar
üretmeye başlamış, böylece tartışma içinde hocalarını yetersiz gördükleri
hususları tamamlamak istemişlerdir. Bu bağlamda onların çabası, dilden ayrı bir
konusunun olduğunu göstermek suretiyle mantığın konumunu belirginleştirmek
şeklinde olmuştur. Bağdat okulu mantıkçıları bunu yapmak için mantığın
konusunun “tümel anlamlar ve onlara delalet eden lafızlar” olduğunu vurgulamış
ve böylece mantığın, lafızları dil biliminde olduğu gibi incelemediğini
göstermek istemişlerdir. Buna rağmen lafızlar hâlâ mantığın konusu olarak
kalmıştır. Bu ilmin konusunun belirginleştirilmesi yönündeki tutum aynıyla İbn
Sînâ’nın eserlerinde de görülmektedir. Ancak seleflerinden farklı olarak o,
mantığın konusunun lafızlarla ilişkilendirilmesinden oldukça rahatsız olmuş ve
önceki filozofları bu hususta eleştirmiştir. İbn Sînâ’ya göre çözüm, mantığın
konusu olan şeyleri lafızlardan bağımsız olarak ele almaktır ki “ikinci
makuller” öğretisi, kendisinin “konusu itibariyle mantığı dilden soyutlama”
düşüncesine güçlü bir argüman teşkil etmiştir. İşte bu yazı İbn Sînâ’nın bu
öğretisini önceki filozoflara yönelik eleştirisiyle birlikte yorumlamakta ve
dil-mantık tartışmasına bir cevap olarak değerlendirmektedir.
Dil-mantık tartışması lafız-anlam ilişkisi Bağdat felsefe okulu Ebû Bişr Mettâ Sîrâfî ikinci makuller İbn Sînâ
Primary Language | Turkish |
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Subjects | Philosophy, Religious Studies |
Journal Section | Makaleler |
Authors | |
Publication Date | July 10, 2019 |
Published in Issue | Year 2019 Issue: 42 |