Is Limiting Executive Compensation a Solution?

Abstract

The debate on the level of executive compensation is once more on the agenda. Today, average firm CEO compensation reaches 400 times that of the average employee in the US. This ratio is 22 in Britain, 10 in Europe and 30 in Turkey. Many nations restrict executive pay. Measures to limit executive compensation and the disclosure of the salaries are planned to be effective as of 2012 in Turkey. This paper first discusses the rationals for limiting the executive compensation. Then, it explores the adverse influences of limiting executive compensation on shareholders. Banking and insurance sectors are at the center of this discussion in Turkey. Pay performance sensitivity is investigated for the firms of those industries which are traded in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The findings indicate that the average pay performance sensitivity is close to zero, and 65% of the firms analysed have negative sensitivity. It is concluded that limiting the executive compensation for Turkey is not a sufficient solution for the shareholders and some suggestions are offered.

Keywords

• Executive compensation, agency theory, pay-performance sensitivity, ISE, Turkey.

Üst Düzey Yönetici Ücretlerini Sınırlandırmak Bir Çözüm müdür?

Öz

Üst düzey yöneticilere yapılan ödemeler hakkındaki tartışmalar yeniden alevlenmiştir. Amerika’da CEO ücretleri, alt kademe çalışanlarının ortalama ücretlerinin 400 katına varmaktadır. Bu oran İngiltere’de 22, Avrupa’da 10, Türkiye’de ise 30 katı düzeyindedir. Birçok ülke, yöneticilere yapılan ödemelere sınırlama getirmektedir. Türkiye’de, üst düzey yönetici ücretlerinin sınırlandırılması ve kamuya açıklanması yolunda 2012 yılından itibaren adımlar atılması planlanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle üst düzey yönetici ücretlerinin sınırlandırılması yönündeki gerekçeler tartışılmaktadır. Daha sonra ise, üst düzey yönetici ücretlerinin sınırlandırılmasının hissedarlar açısından olumsuz yönleri vurgulanmaktadır. Türkiye’de bu konunun en çok tartışıldığı banka ve sigorta sektörlerinde üst düzey yöneticilere yapılan ödemelerin işletme performansına duyarlığı İMKB’de işlem gören söz konusu işletmeler için araştırılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgularda, ilgili sektörlerdeki üst düzey yöneticilere yapılan ödemeler ile işletmelerin performansı arasında ortalama duyarlık sıfıra yakın bulunmuş ve incelenen işletmelerin yüzde altmışbeşinde duyarlığın negatif olduğu saptanmıştır. Türkiye için, ücretlerin sınırlandırılmasının hissedarlar açısından yeterli bir çözüm olmayacağı düşünülmekte ve bu konuda çeşitli önerilerde bulunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Üst düzey yönetici ücretleri, temsil kuramı, ödeme performans duyarlığı, İMKB, Türkiye

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