Kurumsal Yönetimde Vekâlet Sorunu: Worldcom Vak’ası

Öz

Kurumsal yönetim, işletmelerin uzun vadeli sürdürülebilirliğini sağlayan ve hissedarların ve menfaat sahiplerinin çıkarlarını korumayı amaçlayan bir yönetim şeklidir. Kurumsal yönetimin gelişimine katkı sağlayan teorilerin başında vekâlet teorisi ve sonucunda ortaya çıkan vekâlet sorunu gelmektedir. Vekâlet teorisi, asiller ile vekillerin arasındaki ilişkileri düzenlemekte ve bu ilişkiler neticesinde karşılaşılabilecek vekâlet sorunlarını analiz etmektedir. Özellikle 2000’li yılların başından itibaren yaşanan şirket skandalları kurumsal yönetimin önemini artırmış ve kurumsal yönetimin faydaları ile bu skandallardan alınacak dersleri ortaya koymuştur. Şirket skandallarının tarihsel gelişimine bakıldığında en öne çıkanlarından birisi ABD telekomünikasyon sektöründe faaliyet gösteren ve iflasını açıkladığı 2002 yılında dünyanın en önemli telekomünikasyon şirketlerinden birisi olan Worldcom’un çöküşüdür. Bu çalışmada, Worldcom’un çöküşü kurumsal yönetimin en önemli kavramsal temellerinden olan vekâlet sorunu perspektifinden analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kurumsal Yönetim
• Vekalet Sorunu
• Worldcom

Agency Problem in Corporate Governance: Worldcom Case

Abstract

Corporate governance is a form of management that ensures the long-term sustainability of businesses and aims to protect the interests of shareholders and stakeholders. At the forefront of the theories that contribute to the development of corporate governance are the agency theory and the agency problem that emerges as a result. The agency theory regulates the relations between principals and agents and analyzes the agency problems that may be encountered as a result of these relations. In particular, the corporate scandals experienced since the beginning of the 2000s have increased the importance of corporate governance and revealed the benefits of corporate governance and the lessons to be learned from these scandals. When we look at the historical development of the company scandals, one of the most prominent is the collapse of Worldcom, which was operating in the US telecommunications sector and was one of the most important telecommunications companies in the world in 2002, when it declared bankruptcy. In this study, the collapse of Worldcom is analyzed from the perspective of the agency problem, which is one of the most important conceptual foundations of corporate governance.

Keywords

• Corporate Governance
• Agency Problem
• Worldcom

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