High Cost of Venture Capital and Investment Strategy Startups Should Follow

Year 2020, , 229 - 245, 30.06.2020

Mustafa Şeref Akın

https://doi.org/10.26650/ISTJECON2020-0010

Abstract

In this article, the mathematical expansion of the share that the venture capital investors should receive to meet their expectations is shown. After the initial phase has been overcome, the entrepreneurs’ acquaintances around them are insufficient in meeting the capital requirement. For this reason, founders sell some of their resources to other investors who expect a return on investment. In this sense, the support of venture capitalists is critical during the growth phase of the startup. The most crucial dilemma here is how much financing and how many shares will be given. Due to the organizational structure of venture capital and the low success rate in start-ups, it is a costly capital. Expectation rates of investors are not much above the general market ones. The factors that make venture capital so costly are the long waiting period of 5-10 years, and the chances of start-up success being between 10-20%. As a result, the discount rates are well above 50%. Entrepreneurs are disappointed when they give too many shares for little capital. Under these circumstances, the most accurate strategy a start-up can follow is to provide as much financing as needed rather than to negotiate tightly with venture capitalists.

Keywords

Venture capital, Startup, Cash to cash, Hurdle rate

Risk Sermayesinin Yüksek Maliyeti ve Startuplar’ın İzlemesi Gereken Yatırım Stratejisi

Abstract

Bu çalışmada risk sermayesi yatırımcılarının beklentilerini karşılamaları için almaları gereken hisse oranlarının matematiksel açılımı gösterilmektedir. Başlangıç safhası atlatıldıktan sonra, sermaye ihtiyacını karşılamada girişimcinin etrafındaki tanıdıkları yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, startup kurucuları öz kaynaklarının bir kısmını yatırım getirisi bekleyen diğer yatırımcılara satarlar. Startuplar’ın büyümeye geçme aşamasında risk sermayedarlarının desteği bu anlamda kritiktir. Buradaki en önemli açmaz ne kadar yatırıma ne kadar hisse oranı verileceği yönündedir. Risk sermayesinin organizasyon yapısı ve startuplar’daki başarı oranının düşük olması sebebiyle, maliyeti yüksek bir sermayedir. Yatırımcıların beklenti oranları genel piyasa beklentilerinin çok üstünde değildir. Risk sermayesini pahalı yapan unsurlar 5-10 yıl arası değişen uzun bekleme dönemi ve startup’ın başarılı olma ihtimalinin %10-20 arası değişmesidir. Bundan dolayı indirgeme oranları %50’lerin çok üstüne çıkmaktadır. Genellikle startup girişimcisi çok az sermaye karşılığında çok fazla hisse vermiş gibi bir hayal kırıklığı yaşamaktadır. Bu az sermayenin arkasındakinin risk sermayesini göstererek bu oranların bir pazarlık konusu veya bir sömürüden çok sektörün kurgusunun neticesi olduğunun anlaşılmasıdır. Bu şartlarda, startup kurucularının izleyebilecekleri en doğru strateji risk sermayedarlarıyla sıkı pazarlık etmek yerine gerektiği kadar finansman sağlamalarıdır

Keywords

Risk sermayesi, Startup, Nakite nakit, En düşük getiri oranı

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