İçerik Sağlayıcı ve İnternet Servis Sağlayıcı Pazarında Ağ TarafsızlığıTurgut ERKUL1 , Sencer ECER2

Year 2022, Volume: 72 Issue: 2, 689 - 724, 18.01.2023

Turgut Erkul , Sencer Ecer

https://doi.org/10.26650/ISTJECON2022-1113428

Abstract

İnternet servis sağlayıcı ve içerik sağlayıcı arasındaki eksik tamamlayıcılık ilişkisini modelleyerek ağ tarafsızlığının uygulanması ve uygulanmaması gereken ekonomik şartları belirledik. Oyun teorisi yöntemleri ile bulduğumuz dengede, sosyal faydayı maksimize eden erişim ücretinin, model parametreleri olan fiyat etkileri ve çapraz fiyat etkilerine bağlı olduğunu ortaya çıkardık. Sadece servis sağlayıcının kendi fiyat etkisinin içerik sağlayıcınınkinden büyük ve çapraz fiyat etkisinin görece yüksek olduğu durumlarda, ağ tarafsızlığının gevşetilip, erişim ücretine izin verilmesi gerektiği sonucunu bulduk. Eğer içerik sağlayıcının kendi fiyat etkisi servis sağlayıcınınkinden büyükse ve çapraz fiyat etkisi görece yüksekse, bu durumda şirket birleşmelerinin gerçekleşeceğini ve sosyal faydaya zarar vermeyeceğini model çözümünden öngördük. Bulduğumuz sonuçlara dayanarak telekomünikasyon regülasyon kurumları ülkelerindeki internet servis sağlayıcı ve içerik sağlayıcıya ait kendi fiyat etkisi ve çapraz fiyat etkisi bilgilerini kullanarak ağ tarafsızlığı konularında alacakları kararlarını değerlendirebilirler.

Keywords

Ağ tarafsızlığı, sonlandırma ücreti, su yatağı etkisi

Supporting Institution

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Project Number

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Thanks

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Net Neutrality in the Content Provision and Internet Service Provision Markets

Abstract

Relaxing net neutrality in the form of introducing termination fees and its welfare effects are considered in a model of imperfect complements. The equilibrium of the game between the internet service provider (ISP) and the content provider (CP) yields welfare-maximizing termination fees that depend on the relative size of the ISP’s and the CP’s own-price effects and the cross-price effects. Only when the ISP’s own price effect is relatively high compared to that of the CP’s, along with high cross price effects, such a fee should be allowed. On the other hand, when the CP’s own price effect is relatively high compared to that of the ISP’s, along with high cross price effects, mergers are expected and are likely not harmful to social welfare. Telecommunication regulators may find the results useful in their net neutrality decisions.

Keywords

Net neutrality, Termination fee, Waterbed effect

Project Number

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