Automation, Political Competition and Robot Taxation: An Economic Analysis

Abstract

This study analyzes whether political competition warrants a robot tax or a subsidy. Through a simple general equilibrium model, we show that automation replaces routine workers while increasing the productivity of non-routine workers, which creates a political conflict of interest in society. As a result of this conflict, we analyze that two political parties representing different groups of workers engage in a game-theoretic competition to win elections and maximize the benefits of their electorate. In this political competition, both income tax and robot tax policy instruments are used. Our quantitative analysis demonstrates that current robot prices are too high which would result in support by both parties for subsidies for robot use. However, in this study, we show that robot taxes may become inevitable in the long run as robot prices decrease over time due to technological development. We also find that the multidimensionality of the policy space does not have a significant impact on our main findings. Our study contributes to the literature on understanding the effects of automation on political processes and decision-making mechanisms.

Keywords

• Automation
• general equilibrium
• political competition
• robot tax.

Otomasyon, Siyasi Rekabet ve Robot Vergilendirmesi: Ekonomik bir Analiz

Abstract

Bu çalışma, siyasi rekabetin robot vergisi veya sübvansiyonu gerektirip gerektirmediğini analiz etmektedir. Basit bir genel denge modeli aracılığıyla, otomasyonun rutin çalışanları ikame ederken, rutin olmayan çalışanların verimliliğini artırdığını ve bu durumun toplumda siyasi bir çıkar çatışmasına neden olduğunu göstermekteyiz. Bu çatışma sonucunda, farklı işçi gruplarını temsil eden iki siyasi partinin, seçimi kazanmak ve kendi seçmenlerinin faydasını maksimize etmek amacıyla oyun teorik bir rekabete girdiğini analiz ediyoruz. Bu siyasi yarışta, hem gelir vergisi hem de robot vergisi politika araçları kullanılmaktadır. Nicel analizimiz, mevcut robot fiyatlarının yüksek olması nedeniyle her iki partinin de robot kullanımı için sübvansiyonları desteklediğini göstermektedir. Ancak, bu çalışmada, teknolojik gelişmeye bağlı olarak robot fiyatlarının zamanla düşmesiyle birlikte, uzun vadede robot vergisinin kaçınılmaz hale gelebileceğini ortaya koyuyoruz. Ayrıca, politika alanının çok boyutlu olmasının, temel bulgularımız üzerinde belirgin bir etkisi olmadığını da tespit ediyoruz. Çalışmamız, otomasyonun siyasi süreçler ve karar alma mekanizmaları üzerindeki etkilerini anlamaya yönelik literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır.

Keywords

• Otomasyon
• genel denge
• siyasi rekabet
• robot vergisi.

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