IHL’s Remedies for the Legal Status Problem of the “Corporate Warriors”

Abstract

The use of private military and security companies by states, particularly by those in the Middle East and Africa (MENA) region, has remarkably increased in the last decade. With the exponentially increasing use of private military and security companies, an important question arises: Why have many states started to prefer outsourcing one of their essential functions which is the monopoly on the use of force? Apparently, they have some good reasons such as cost efficiency, political non-liability or quicker and more qualified military service procurement. However, with the exponential proliferation of the private military and security companies (PMSCs) as the new actors of the “battlefield”, the accustomed rules of war have been changing, and still there are some uncertainties about how to regulate these new actors’ status and activities, which may often not be in compliance with the principles and norms of the international humanitarian law. To address these uncertainties, in this paper, the legal framework regarding the PMSCs will be examined. However, the examination will specifically be through the prism of international humanitarian law (IHL). By doing so, it is aimed to identify some remedies for the legal status problem of the PMSCs in this field of international law.

Keywords

• Private military and security companies,Modern mercenaries,Privatization of war,Corporate warriors

“Şirket Savaşçılarının” Statü Sorununa Ilişkin Uluslararası Insancıl Hukukun Getirdiği Çözümler

Abstract

Geçtiğimiz on yıl içerisinde özel askeri ve güvenlik şirketlerinin, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesindeki devletler başta olmak üzere, devletler tarafından kullanımı kaydadeğer derecede artmıştır. Bu şirketlerin gitgide daha fazla kullanılmasıyla birlikte önemli bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Neden birçok devlet, sahip oldukları meşru kuvvet kullanımı tekeline rağmen böylesi temel bir işlevlerini dışarıya aktarmaktadır? Açıktır ki maliyet verimliliği, siyasi sorumsuzluk, daha hızlı ve nitelikli askeri hizmet temini gibi bazı iyi sebepler bulunmaktadır. Fakat “savaş alanının” gitgide daha yaygın hâle gelen bu yeni aktörleriyle birlikte savaşa ilişkin geleneksel kurallar değişmekte, ayrıca bu yeni aktörlerin statülerinin ve sıklıkla uluslararası insancıl hukukun ilke ve kurallarına uyum göstermeyebilen faaliyetlerinin nasıl düzenleneceğine ilişkin bazı belirsizlikler hâlâ sürmektedir. Bu makalede, söz konusu belirsizliklere bir çözüm bulabilmek amacıyla özel askeri ve askeri şirketlerine ilişkin yasal çerçeve incelenecektir. Ancak bu inceleme özel olarak uluslararası insancıl hukuk perspektifinden yapılacaktır. Böylelikle, uluslararası hukukun bu alanının özel askeri ve güvenlik şirketlerinin hukuk statü sorununa ilişkin ortaya koyduğu çözümler tespit edilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Keywords

• Özel askeri ve güvenlik şirketleri,Modern paralı askerler,Savaşların özelleşmesi,Şirket savaşçıları

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