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Cambridge Değişimi ve bir Zorunlu Soru: Bir Nesne Olmak Ne demektir?

Year 2020, , 1 - 24, 31.12.2020
https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp.843068

Abstract

Analitik felsefe özellikle metafizik karşıtı bir yaklaşım içerisinde olmakla nitelendirilmiştir. Ancak 20.yüzyılda bu gelenekte önemli dönüşümler yaşanmıştır. Dile dönüş ile başlayan tartışmalar sonrasında metafiziğe dönüşü ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bugün açık bir biçimde analitik metafizik ya da ontolojilerden söz edilebilmektedir. Elbette farklı ontolojiler farklı varolanlar ve farklı kategorileştirmeleri merkezlerine koymaktadırlar. 20. yüzyılın başında değişimin ne olduğu konusunda ortaya konan görüşler de çağdaş ontoloji tartışmalarında değişim konusunun ayrı bir başlık olarak ele alınabilmesi için bir zemin yaratmıştır. Farklı felsefi yaklaşım içerisinde olmalarına rağmen McTaggart ve Russell benzer bir felsefe yapma tarzı içerisindedirler. Bu kısmi benzerlik Geach’in her iki düşünürün değişim konusundaki yaklaşımlarını tek bir başlık altında, aynı şekilde değerlendirmesine yol açmıştır. Geach bu filozofların değişim tanımlarını her iki filozofun da Cambridge Üniversitesinde olmalarından kaynaklı Cambridge Değişimi olarak adlandırmış ve görüşlerini eleştirmiştir. Geach Cambridge Değişiminin gerçek değişimleri gölgede bıraktığını, tüm değişimleri aynılaştırdığını iddia etmektedir. Bu yazıda Geach’in eleştirisinin haklı olmadığı, kendi önerisinin başka bazı öncüllere gerek duyduğu üzerinden gösterilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Geach gerçek değişimleri nesnede bir farklılık yaratan değişimler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Ancak bu tanım şu soruyu sormamızı gerektirir: Dilde özne yerindeki terimin gönderimi durumundaki nesne nedir? Nasıl bireyleşir ve bireyleşiminde hangi ontolojik varolanlar etkilidir? Bu sorular analitik metafizikte nesne kuramlarının ele alınmasını gerektirir. Dayanak ve Demet kuramlarının ele alınmasıyla ontolojik olarak özelliklerin önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır ancak bu Geach’in iddiasının yerinde olmadığını açık kılmaktadır. Bir nesne tartışması yapmadan bir değişim tartışması ve ona bağlı olarak özelliklerin derecelendirilmesinden söz edilemez.

References

  • Allaire, Edwin B. “Bare Particulars.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 14, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Feb., 1963): 1-8.
  • Armstrong, D. M. Universals: an opinionated introduction. London: Westview Press, 1989.
  • Bergmann, Gustav. Realism: a critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
  • Berto, Franceso ve Matteo Plebani. Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide. Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.
  • Black, Max. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Metaphysics: contemporary readings. ed. M. J. Loux, 104-114. NY: Routledge, 2005.
  • Bradley, H. F. Appearance and Reality: a metaphysical essay. 6th Imp. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1916.
  • Butchvarov, Panayot. “The Ontology of Philosophical Analysis.” Noûs, Mar., 1981, Vol. 15, No. 1, (1981): 3-14. Campbell, Keith. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990.
  • Denkel, Arda. “Substance Without Substratum.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 52, No. 3, (Sep., 1992), 705-711.
  • Dorr, Cian. “Natural Properties”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/natural-properties/>. Erişim: 16.11.2020.
  • Geach, Peter, God and the Soul. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1969.
  • Geach, Peter. Logic Matters. Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 1973.
  • Geach, P. ve Robert H. Stoothoff, “What Actually Exists.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. Vol. 42 (1968): 7-30.
  • Gözcü, A. Suat. “ZAMAN SORUNU: ŞİMDİCİ VE EBEDİYETÇİ ZAMAN ANLAYIŞLARI”, Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları, Eylül 2018, Sayı 38, 41-65.
  • Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Lewis, David. On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
  • Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. J. Yolton. London: Dent, 1961.
  • Lombard, Lawrence Brian. “Relational Change and Relational Changes.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. Jul., 1978, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jul., 1978): 63-79.
  • Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction. London: Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 2006.
  • Loux, Michael J. Substance and Attribute: a study in ontology. Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Com., 1978.
  • Lowe, E. J. “Individuation.” The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 75-95. Ed. Loux&Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
  • Martin, C. B. “Substance substantiated.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58:1, (1980): 3-10.
  • McTaggart, J.M.E. “The Unreality of Time”, Mind, 17(68) (1908): 457–474.
  • McTaggart, J.M.E. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
  • Michaelson, Eliot ve Marga Reimer, “Reference”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Mortensen, Chris, “Change and Inconsistency.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/change/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Orilia, Francesco ve Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/properties/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Quine, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
  • Robinson, Howard. “Substance”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/substance/> Erişim: 26 Ağustos 2020. Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” Mind 114, no. 456 (2005): 873-87. R
  • ussell, Bertrand. “The Problem of Universals.” Russell on Metaphysics: selections from the writings of Bertrand Russell. ed. S. Mumford, 143-161. London: Routledge, 2003.
  • Russell, Bertrand. An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth. London: George Allen&Unwin Ltd, 1956. Russell, Bertrand. Felsefe Sorunları. çev. Vehbi Hacıkadiroğlu. İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2000.
  • Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Routledge Classics, 2009.
  • Russell, Bertrand. Principles of Mathematics, London: Routledge, 1937.
  • Simons, Peter. “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 3, (Sep. 1994): 553-575.
  • Strawson, P. F. “On Referring.” Mind, Jul., 1950, Vol. 59, No. 235 (Jul., 1950): 320-344.
  • Van Cleve, James. “Three Versions of Bundle Theory”, Metaphysics: contemporary readings. Ed. M. J. Loux, 121-134. NY: Routledge, 2005.

Cambridge Change and a Necessary Question: What is it to be an Object?

Year 2020, , 1 - 24, 31.12.2020
https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp.843068

Abstract

Analytical philosophy is often thought as anti-metaphysical. However, in the 20th century, important transformations have taken place in this tradition. After the debates that started with a linguistic turn, a metaphysical turn emerged. Nowadays, one can clearly speak of analytical metaphysics or ontologies. Different ontologies place different entities and categorizations at their center. The views put forward on ‘what change is’ at the beginning of the 20th century also created a ground for the change to be addressed as a separate topic in contemporary ontology discussions. Although they have a different philosophical approach, McTaggart and Russell share similar philosophical methods. This partial similarity caused Geach to evaluate both thinkers' approaches of definition of change under a single heading in the same way. Geach criticized these philosophers and called their definitions of change the ‘Cambridge Change’. Geach argues that the Cambridge Change overshadows real changes, it makes all changes identical. In this article, we try to show that Geach’s criticism is not justified and his proposal requires some other premises. Geach defines real changes as changes that make a difference in the object. But what is the object? This question requires a consideration of object theories in analytical metaphysics. With the consideration of the Substratum and the Bundle theories, the importance of the properties on an ontological basis emerges, but this makes it clear that Geach’s claim is not well-founded. Without a discussion on objects, there is no discussion of change and the grading of properties depending on it.

References

  • Allaire, Edwin B. “Bare Particulars.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 14, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Feb., 1963): 1-8.
  • Armstrong, D. M. Universals: an opinionated introduction. London: Westview Press, 1989.
  • Bergmann, Gustav. Realism: a critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
  • Berto, Franceso ve Matteo Plebani. Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide. Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.
  • Black, Max. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Metaphysics: contemporary readings. ed. M. J. Loux, 104-114. NY: Routledge, 2005.
  • Bradley, H. F. Appearance and Reality: a metaphysical essay. 6th Imp. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1916.
  • Butchvarov, Panayot. “The Ontology of Philosophical Analysis.” Noûs, Mar., 1981, Vol. 15, No. 1, (1981): 3-14. Campbell, Keith. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990.
  • Denkel, Arda. “Substance Without Substratum.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 52, No. 3, (Sep., 1992), 705-711.
  • Dorr, Cian. “Natural Properties”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/natural-properties/>. Erişim: 16.11.2020.
  • Geach, Peter, God and the Soul. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1969.
  • Geach, Peter. Logic Matters. Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 1973.
  • Geach, P. ve Robert H. Stoothoff, “What Actually Exists.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. Vol. 42 (1968): 7-30.
  • Gözcü, A. Suat. “ZAMAN SORUNU: ŞİMDİCİ VE EBEDİYETÇİ ZAMAN ANLAYIŞLARI”, Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları, Eylül 2018, Sayı 38, 41-65.
  • Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Lewis, David. On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
  • Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. J. Yolton. London: Dent, 1961.
  • Lombard, Lawrence Brian. “Relational Change and Relational Changes.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. Jul., 1978, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jul., 1978): 63-79.
  • Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction. London: Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 2006.
  • Loux, Michael J. Substance and Attribute: a study in ontology. Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Com., 1978.
  • Lowe, E. J. “Individuation.” The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 75-95. Ed. Loux&Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
  • Martin, C. B. “Substance substantiated.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58:1, (1980): 3-10.
  • McTaggart, J.M.E. “The Unreality of Time”, Mind, 17(68) (1908): 457–474.
  • McTaggart, J.M.E. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
  • Michaelson, Eliot ve Marga Reimer, “Reference”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Mortensen, Chris, “Change and Inconsistency.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/change/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Orilia, Francesco ve Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/properties/>. Erişim: 16. 11. 2020.
  • Quine, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
  • Robinson, Howard. “Substance”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/substance/> Erişim: 26 Ağustos 2020. Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” Mind 114, no. 456 (2005): 873-87. R
  • ussell, Bertrand. “The Problem of Universals.” Russell on Metaphysics: selections from the writings of Bertrand Russell. ed. S. Mumford, 143-161. London: Routledge, 2003.
  • Russell, Bertrand. An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth. London: George Allen&Unwin Ltd, 1956. Russell, Bertrand. Felsefe Sorunları. çev. Vehbi Hacıkadiroğlu. İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2000.
  • Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Routledge Classics, 2009.
  • Russell, Bertrand. Principles of Mathematics, London: Routledge, 1937.
  • Simons, Peter. “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 3, (Sep. 1994): 553-575.
  • Strawson, P. F. “On Referring.” Mind, Jul., 1950, Vol. 59, No. 235 (Jul., 1950): 320-344.
  • Van Cleve, James. “Three Versions of Bundle Theory”, Metaphysics: contemporary readings. Ed. M. J. Loux, 121-134. NY: Routledge, 2005.
There are 34 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Research Articles
Authors

Egemen Seyfettin Kuşcu 0000-0001-8549-5927

Publication Date December 31, 2020
Published in Issue Year 2020

Cite

Chicago Kuşcu, Egemen Seyfettin. “Cambridge Değişimi Ve Bir Zorunlu Soru: Bir Nesne Olmak Ne Demektir?”. Felsefe Arkivi, no. 53 (December 2020): 1-24. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp.843068.