ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

Abstract

Recent game theoretical studies illustrate that mutual trust among people is what a society needs to be able to sustain a market order on a long-term basis and at reasonable transaction costs. In this context, social norms play a crucial role in the evolution of the economic structure, On the other hand, the evolution of the market structure and other economic institutions means something more than simply a change in the ways of allocation of goods and resources and has a profound effect on social norms and values that form our preferences. In this paper, by drawing on the game theory literature, we first explore the role played by social norms and generalized morality in the expansion of markets. Secondly, by using the endogenous preferences model, we discuss how these social norms can be influenced by the evolution of the economic structure. The last part of the paper is a case study on conversion to Islam in Sub Saharan Africa, in which we test the relevance of our theoretical arguments.

Keywords

• ECONOMIC
• PERSPECTIVES
• CULTURAL

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

Abstract

Son dönemdeki oyun teorisi çalışmaları toplumun düşük İşlem maliyetli bir piyasa düzenini uzun vadede sürdürebilmek için bireyler arasındaki karşılıklı güven ilişkisine ihtiyaç duyduğuna işaret eder. Bu bağlamda, sosyal normlar iktisadi yapının evriminde belirleyicidirler, Diğer yandan, piyasanın ve diğer iktisadi kurumların dönüşümü sadece malların ve kaynakların tahsisinden öte tercihlerimizi şekillendiren sosyal normlar ve değerler üzerinde belirleyici rol oynar. Bu makalede, oyun teorisi literatürü üzerinden örneklerle, öncelikle sosyal normlarin ve genel ahlak yapısının piyasalarin gelişmesindeki rolünü inceleyeceğiz. İkinci olarak, endojen tercihler modeli üzerinden sosyal normlarin iktisadi yapının evrim sürecinde nasıl değişebileceğini tartışacağız. Son bölümde ise Salıara Altı Afrikasmda Müslümanlığa geçiş süreci üzerine yapılan çalışmalar üzerinden teorik argümanlarımızın geçerliliğini sınayacağız.

Keywords

• ECONOMIC
• PERSPECTIVES
• CULTURAL

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