SEÇİM SÜRECİ VE MALİYE POLİTİKASI DALGALANMALARI: BİR ALAN TARAMASI

Year 2012, Issue: 57, 119 - 134, 10.03.2013

İhsan Erdem Sofracı

Abstract

Tüm sanayileşmiş ülkeler ekonomik gelişme sürecinde önemli ölçüde mali dalgalanma deneyimi yaşamıştır. Biz bu çalışmamızda, bu dalgalanma deneyimleri ile ilgili olarak, seçim dönemlerinde uygulanan mali politikalarla ilgili süreci alan taraması kapsamında sunmayı amaçlamaktayız. Politik konjonktür ve bütçesel dalgalanmalar da bu deneyimde büyük öneme sahiptir. Bu nedenle, çalışmamız bu konuları temel alan çalışmalara yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışmanın mali harcamaların artışıyla ilgili temel bulgusu; seçim sürecinin olası koşullarının politika ve bürokrasiyi verimli alanlardan, rant üreten faaliyetlere doğru yönlendirdiği şeklinde olup ve makro değişkenleri, başta büyüme olmak üzere, olumsuz anlamda etkileyebilir. Hükümet ile ilgili siyasi belirsizliğin genel bir istikrarsızlığa neden olabileceği konusu da bulgular arasında yer almaktadır.

Keywords

Seçim, Maliye Politikası, Konjonktür ve Bütçe Dalgalanması

THE ELECTION PROCESS AND FISCAL POLICY CYCLES: A SURVEY

Abstract

All industrial economies have been experienced significant fiscal policy cycle in their economic process. Related with these cycles, the paper is about basic level study about fiscal policies around elections within restricted theoretical background. Both political and budget cycles have crucial rules for understanding cyclical effects of fiscal policy around elections as well. That’s why; this paper could be focused given basic literature related with these subjects. In this paper, the main argument is uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent-seeking activities; then, distorted incentives affect growth. Finally, policy uncertainty as measured by the variability of government capacity will be reason of instability conditions as a whole.

Keywords

Election, Fiscal Policy, Business and Budget Cycle

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