-

Öz

The use of experimental method in the world of economics, particularly because of that economic behavior is quite complex and human modeling is shaped by homo economicus, was met with great resistance for a long time. But human modeling of economics was widely criticized in the 1940 and experimental studies on market structures have been taking first steps since then. This process led to experimental studies of individual decision-making in the 1960s and 70s. The importance of these studies has been noticed and a Nobel Prize was given to Vernon Smith for his contributions to experimental economics by Nobel Committee in 2002. The most important contribution to the economic theories of these experimental studies in economics is that it helps in finding the answer to the question to what extent economics theories are valid in real life.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Experimental Economics, Field Experiments, Incentives, Laboratory Experiments, Methodology

İKTİSAT VE DENEYSEL YÖNTEM: DENEYLER, TARTIŞMALAR VE GELECEK

Öz

İktisat dünyasında deneysel yöntemin kullanımı özellikle iktisadi davranışların oldukça karmaşık özelliklere sahip olması ve homo economicus ile şekillenen insan modellemesi nedeniyle uzun yıllar büyük bir dirençle karşılaşmıştır. Fakat 1940'larda iktisadın bu insan modellemesine yönelik eleştiriler yüksek sesle ifade edilmeye başlanmış ve piyasa yapılarına yönelik deneysel çalışmalar ile bu konuda ilk adımlar atılmıştır. 1960 ve 70'lerde bireysel karar verme üzerine yapılan deneysel çalışmalar ile de bu süreç hızlanmıştır. Bu çalışmaların önemi Nobel Komitesi'nin 2002 yıllında deneysel iktisatta yaptığı katkılardan dolayı Vernon Smith'e ödül vermesiyle de tescillenmiştir. İktisatta yapılan bu deneysel çalışmaların en önemli katkısı iktisat teorilerinin gerçek hayatta ne derece geçerli olduğu sorusunun cevabını bulmada yardımcı olmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Deneysel İktisat, Alan Deneyleri, Laboratuar Deneyleri, Teşvikler, Metodoloji

Kaynakça

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