KYOTO PROTOKOLÜ UYGULAMA MEKANİZMALARI:KUSURLU MU YOKSA UMUT VERİCİ KAVRAMLAR MI?

Abstract

OZET

Kyoto Protokolu bazı aydınlar tarafından ovguyle karsılanırken bazıları tarafından da elestirilmektedir. Bu makale, formel olmayan bir oyun teorisi analizi uzerine kurulan kontrol ve uyumsuzluk prosedurlerini icinde barındıran uygulama mekanizmalarını ele almaktadır. Kontrol sisteminin daha once gorulmemis duzeyde bir kapsamlılık gosterdiği one surulmektedir. Ayrıca uyumsuzluk prosedurleri de caydırıcılık potansiyeli ve guvenilirliği bakımından -hala gelistirilmesi gereken noktalar olsa bile- dikkate değer bir kalite duzeyine ulasmıs gorunmektedir (Ozellikle cevreyle ilgili gecmisteki uluslararası anlasmalarla karsılastırıldığında). Yapılabilecek iyilestirmeler ana hatlarıyla belirtilmis ve eklenebilecek uyumsuzluk prosedurleri onerilmistir.

Keywords

• Kyoto Protokolü, Kontrol, Uyumsuzluk Prosedürleri

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