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ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR

Year 2011, Issue: 2, 148 - 155, 10.04.2012

Abstract

ÖZET
Bretton Woods sisteminin çöküşü ile birlikte sermaye hareketlerinin serbestleşmesi
uluslararası ekonomik sistem açısından yeni bir dönemin başlamasına sebep
olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, uluslararası sermaye hareketliliğinin iktisat politikalarının
belirlenmesinde oynadığı rol de giderek önem kazanmıştır. Finansal piyasalarda
görülen liberalleşmenin ülkeler arası farklılıkları ortadan kaldırarak iktisat politikalarında
yakınsamaya yol açması ve iç politika otonomisini sınırlaması beklenen
bir durumdur. Ancak dış politika yakınsaması üzerine yapılan teorik ve ampirik çalışmalar,
dış politika ıraksaması ya da iç politika otonomisini destekler nitelikteki
bulguların daha güçlü olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası sermaye
hareketliliği altında politika karışımlarının nasıl belirlendiği üzerinde durularak
hükümetlerin para ve maliye politikası tercihlerinin, politika ıraksamalarına
yol açabildiği hususu, David H. Bearce'ın teorik yaklaşımı çerçevesinde açıklanmaya
çalışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, politika ıraksamalarında partizan-ideolojik faktörlerin
rolü üzerinde durularak konuya ilişkin teorik bir inceleme yapılması amaçlanmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası sermaye hareketliliği, politika karışımları,
hükümet partizanlığı, politika ıraksaması.
POLICY MIXES AND PARTISAN DIVERGENCES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY
ABSTRACT
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and liberalization of capital movements
have led to begin a new era for international economic system. In this respect,
the role of international capital mobility on the determination of economic
policies has increasingly gained importance. It is expected that liberalization in financial
markets leads to convergence in economic policies by removing intercountry
differences and limits domestic policy autonomy. However, the theoretical
and empirical studies on external policy convergence indicate that the evidence on
external policy divergence or domestic policy autonomy is much stronger. In this
study, we concentrate on how the policy mixes are determined under international
capital mobility and try to explain within David H. Bearce's theoretical approach
how the monetary and fiscal policy choices of governments result in policy divergences.
In this context, we aim to make a theoretical review by clarifying the role of
partisan-ideological factors on policy divergences.
Keywords: International capital mobility, policy mixes, government partisanship,
policy divergence.

References

  • Bearce, David H . (2002), "Monetary Divergence: Domestic Political Institutions and the Policy Autonomy-Exchange Rate Stability Trade-off, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 194ı 220.
  • Bearce, David H. (2007), Monetary Divergence: Domestic Policy Autonomy in the Post-Bretton Woods Era, The University of Michigan Press.
  • Broz, J. Lawrence and Jeffry A. Frieden (2001), "The Political Economy O f International Monetary Relations", Annual Review of Political Science, No. 4, pp. 317-343.
  • Cusack, Thomas R. (1997), "Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending i n the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989", Public 3, pp. 792-827. Choice, Vol. 91, Issue 3-4, pp. 375-95.
  • Drezner, Daniel W. (2001), "Globalization and Policy Convergence", International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 53-78.
  • Fleming, Marcus (1962), "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 369-80.
  • Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991), "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies i n a World of Global Finance", International Organization, Economy", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. Volume 45, Issue 4, pp. 425-51. 43, No. 4, pp. 1003-1027.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (1995), "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy", International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 657ı 87.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (1998), "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?", International Organization, 52: 4, pp. 787ı 824.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (2000), "Capital mobility, Exchange rates and fiscal policy i n the global economy", Review of International Political Economy, 7:1, pp. 153-170.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange (1991), "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's "Left" for the Left?", International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 539-564.
  • Gowa, Joanne (1988), "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States", International Organization, Volume 42, No. 1, pp. 15-32.
  • Hallerberg, Mark (2002), "Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions", International Organization, 56: 4, pp. 775-802.
  • Hibbs, Jr., Douglas A. (1977), "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, No.4, pp. 1467-1487.
  • Iversen, Torben and David Soskice (1999), "Monetary Integration, Partisanship, and
  • Lange, Peter and Geoffrey Garrett (1985), "The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance i n the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980", The Journal of Politics, Volume 47, Issue
  • Moses, Jonathon W. (1994), "Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave", Politics and Society, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp. 125-48.
  • Mundell, Robert A. (1963), "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 475-85.
  • Oatley, Thomas (1999), "How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis i n an Open
  • Reinhart, Carmen M . , and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2004), "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119 (1), pp. 1—48.
  • Rose, Andrew K. (1994), "Exchange Rate Volatility, Monetary Policy, and Capital Mobility: Empirical Evidence on the Holy Trinity", NBER Working Paper Series, No: 4630.
  • Tinbergen, Jan (1952), On the Theory of Economic Policy, North-Holland Pub. Co., Amsterdam.
  • Webb, Michael C. (1991), "International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies", International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 309-342.
Year 2011, Issue: 2, 148 - 155, 10.04.2012

Abstract

References

  • Bearce, David H . (2002), "Monetary Divergence: Domestic Political Institutions and the Policy Autonomy-Exchange Rate Stability Trade-off, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 194ı 220.
  • Bearce, David H. (2007), Monetary Divergence: Domestic Policy Autonomy in the Post-Bretton Woods Era, The University of Michigan Press.
  • Broz, J. Lawrence and Jeffry A. Frieden (2001), "The Political Economy O f International Monetary Relations", Annual Review of Political Science, No. 4, pp. 317-343.
  • Cusack, Thomas R. (1997), "Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending i n the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989", Public 3, pp. 792-827. Choice, Vol. 91, Issue 3-4, pp. 375-95.
  • Drezner, Daniel W. (2001), "Globalization and Policy Convergence", International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 53-78.
  • Fleming, Marcus (1962), "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 369-80.
  • Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991), "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies i n a World of Global Finance", International Organization, Economy", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. Volume 45, Issue 4, pp. 425-51. 43, No. 4, pp. 1003-1027.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (1995), "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy", International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 657ı 87.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (1998), "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?", International Organization, 52: 4, pp. 787ı 824.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey (2000), "Capital mobility, Exchange rates and fiscal policy i n the global economy", Review of International Political Economy, 7:1, pp. 153-170.
  • Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange (1991), "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's "Left" for the Left?", International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 539-564.
  • Gowa, Joanne (1988), "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States", International Organization, Volume 42, No. 1, pp. 15-32.
  • Hallerberg, Mark (2002), "Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions", International Organization, 56: 4, pp. 775-802.
  • Hibbs, Jr., Douglas A. (1977), "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, No.4, pp. 1467-1487.
  • Iversen, Torben and David Soskice (1999), "Monetary Integration, Partisanship, and
  • Lange, Peter and Geoffrey Garrett (1985), "The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance i n the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980", The Journal of Politics, Volume 47, Issue
  • Moses, Jonathon W. (1994), "Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave", Politics and Society, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp. 125-48.
  • Mundell, Robert A. (1963), "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 475-85.
  • Oatley, Thomas (1999), "How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis i n an Open
  • Reinhart, Carmen M . , and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2004), "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119 (1), pp. 1—48.
  • Rose, Andrew K. (1994), "Exchange Rate Volatility, Monetary Policy, and Capital Mobility: Empirical Evidence on the Holy Trinity", NBER Working Paper Series, No: 4630.
  • Tinbergen, Jan (1952), On the Theory of Economic Policy, North-Holland Pub. Co., Amsterdam.
  • Webb, Michael C. (1991), "International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies", International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 309-342.
There are 23 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Sinem Kutlu

Publication Date April 10, 2012
Published in Issue Year 2011 Issue: 2

Cite

APA Kutlu, S. (2012). ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi(2), 148-155.
AMA Kutlu S. ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. April 2012;(2):148-155.
Chicago Kutlu, Sinem. “ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR”. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 2 (April 2012): 148-55.
EndNote Kutlu S (April 1, 2012) ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 2 148–155.
IEEE S. Kutlu, “ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR”, Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 2, pp. 148–155, April 2012.
ISNAD Kutlu, Sinem. “ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR”. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 2 (April 2012), 148-155.
JAMA Kutlu S. ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 2012;:148–155.
MLA Kutlu, Sinem. “ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR”. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 2, 2012, pp. 148-55.
Vancouver Kutlu S. ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 2012(2):148-55.