Research Article
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HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?

Year 2019, Volume 8, Issue 1, 17 - 27, 30.03.2019
https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012

Abstract

Purpose - This paper aims to examine the association between inventory level and analyst forecast accuracy. Firms can potentially manage earnings through inventory manipulation, and we hypothesize that it is therefore more difficult to forecast earnings in companies with large inventories.
Methodology - Analyst forecast accuracy is measured by forecast error, computed as the absolute value of the difference between forecasted earnings per share and actual earnings per share, normalized by the firm's stock price. Univariate tests and regression models are used to examine the relation between forecast error and inventory level. We further investigate whether analyst experience and the level of institutional ownership can reduce the forecast error.
Findings - The results show that forecast error is greater in firms with relatively higher levels of inventories and the size of the error decreases as analyst experience and the level of institutional ownership increase.
Conclusion - This study demonstrates that it is important for analysts to take extra care in forecasting earnings for companies with a history of high inventory levels.

References

  • Agrawal, A., Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2), 371-406.
  • Athanasakou, V. E., Strong, N. C., Walker, M. (2009). Earnings management or forecast guidance to meet analyst expectations? Accounting and Business Research, 39(1), 3-35.
  • Baber, W. R., Fairfield, P. M., Haggard, J. A. (1991). The effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: the case of research and development. The Accounting Review, 66(4), 818–829.
  • Bartov, E. (1993). The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, 68(4), 840–855.
  • Bartov, E., Givoly, D., Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 173-204.
  • Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2), 15–35.
  • Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (3), 511–529.
  • Bernard, V., Noel, J. (1991). Do inventory disclosures predict sales and earnings? Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 6(2), 145-181.
  • Bruggen, A., Krishnan, R., Sedatole, K. L. (2011). Drivers and consequences of short-term production decisions: Evidence for the auto industry. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(1), 83-123.
  • Bushee, B. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305–333.
  • Chou, D., Gombola, M., Liu, F. (2006). Earnings management and stock performance of reverse leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(2), 407–438.
  • Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, J. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48.
  • Clement, M. (1999). Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3), 285–303.
  • Clement, M. B., Tse, S. Y. (2003). Do investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if forecast accuracy is all that matters? The Accounting Review, 78(1), 227-249.
  • Cohen, D., Dey, A., Lys, T. (2008). Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. The Accounting Review, 83(3), 757–787.
  • Cohen, D., Mashruwala, R., Zach, T. (2010). The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: Evidence from monthly data. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(4), 808–832.
  • Cohen, D. A., Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(1), 2–19.
  • DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review, 61(3), 400-420.
  • Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14 (1), 51–89.
  • Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36.
  • DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulations of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 145-176.
  • DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H., Sefcik, S. E. (2004). Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(1), 27-49.
  • Fields, T., Lyz, T., Vincent, L. (2001). Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1–3): 255–308.
  • Frankel, R., Kothari, S. P., Weber, J. (2006). Determinants of the informativeness of analyst research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2), 29–54.
  • Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1-3), 3-73.
  • Gu, F., Wang, W. (2005). Intangible assets, information complexity, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), 1673-1702.
  • Guidry, F., Leone, A. J., Rock, S. (1999). Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26(1-3), 113-142.
  • Hadani, M., Goranova, M., Khan, R. (2011). Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management. Journal of Business Research, 64(12), 1352–1360.
  • Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J. M., Nahata, R. (2012). Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 44–69.
  • Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.
  • Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. (1995). The challenges of investor communication. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(2), 111-140.
  • Healy, P. M., Wahlen, J. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365–383.
  • Herrmann, D., Inoue, T., Thomas, W. (2003). The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1), 89–108.
  • Hong, H., Kubik, J. D. (2003). Analyzing the analysts: career concerns and biased earnings forecasts. Journal of Finance, 58(1), 313–51.
  • Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., Solomon, A. (2000). Security analysts’ career concerns and the herding of earnings forecasts. Rand Journal of Economics, 31(1), 121–44.
  • Hribar, P., Jenkins, N., Johnson, W. (2006). Stock repurchases as an earnings management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1), 3–27.
  • Jackson, S., Wilcox, W. (2000). Do managers grant sales price reductions to avoid losses and declines in earnings and sales? Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 39(4), 3–20.
  • Jiambalvo, J., Noreen, E., Shevlin, T. (1997). Incremental information content of the change in the percent of production added to inventory. Contemporary Accounting Research, 14(1), 69-97.
  • Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193-228.
  • Kahn, J. (1987). Inventories and volatility of production. The American Economic Review, 77(4), 667-679.
  • Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 57-81.
  • Key, K. G. (1997). Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(3), 309-337.
  • Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375–400.
  • Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 105–231.
  • Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Starks, L. T., Wei, K. D., Yan, H. (2007). Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(2), 420-456.
  • Matsunaga, S. R., Park, C. W. (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review, 76(3), 313–332.
  • Mergenthaler, R. D., Rajgopal, S., Srinivasan, S. (2012). CEO and CFO career penalties to missing quarterly earnings forecasts. working Paper, Harvard Business School.
  • Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., Willis, R. H. (1997). Do security analysts improve their performance with experience? Journal of Accounting Research, 35, 131-157.
  • Mikhail, M., Walther, B., Willis, R. (2003). The effect of experience on security analyst underreaction. Journal of Accounting Economics, 35(1), 101–116.
  • Perry, S. E., Williams, T. H. (1994). Earnings management preceding management buyout offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(2), 157-179.
  • Plumlee, M. (2003). The effect of information complexity on analysts' use of that information. The Accounting Review, 78(1), 275-296.
  • Rangan, S. (1998). Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 101-122.
  • Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(3), 335-370.
  • Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizon, 3(4), 91–102.
  • Shivakumar, L. (2000). Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(3), 339-371.
  • Siegel, P., Lessard, J., Karim, K. (2011). Analyst forecast accuracy and firm growth. Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting, 9, 1-31.
  • Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., Wong, T. J. (1998a). Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935–1974.
  • Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., Wong, T. J. (1998b). Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 63-99.
  • Thomas, J. K., Zhang, H. (2002). Inventory changes and future returns. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2-3), 163–187.
  • Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings .Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61-91.
  • Watts, R. L., Zimmerman, J. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
  • Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N., DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the roles of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295–316.
  • Zang, A. Y. (2012). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. Accounting Review, 87(2), 675–703.

Year 2019, Volume 8, Issue 1, 17 - 27, 30.03.2019
https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012

Abstract

References

  • Agrawal, A., Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2), 371-406.
  • Athanasakou, V. E., Strong, N. C., Walker, M. (2009). Earnings management or forecast guidance to meet analyst expectations? Accounting and Business Research, 39(1), 3-35.
  • Baber, W. R., Fairfield, P. M., Haggard, J. A. (1991). The effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: the case of research and development. The Accounting Review, 66(4), 818–829.
  • Bartov, E. (1993). The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, 68(4), 840–855.
  • Bartov, E., Givoly, D., Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 173-204.
  • Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2), 15–35.
  • Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (3), 511–529.
  • Bernard, V., Noel, J. (1991). Do inventory disclosures predict sales and earnings? Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 6(2), 145-181.
  • Bruggen, A., Krishnan, R., Sedatole, K. L. (2011). Drivers and consequences of short-term production decisions: Evidence for the auto industry. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(1), 83-123.
  • Bushee, B. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305–333.
  • Chou, D., Gombola, M., Liu, F. (2006). Earnings management and stock performance of reverse leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(2), 407–438.
  • Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, J. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48.
  • Clement, M. (1999). Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3), 285–303.
  • Clement, M. B., Tse, S. Y. (2003). Do investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if forecast accuracy is all that matters? The Accounting Review, 78(1), 227-249.
  • Cohen, D., Dey, A., Lys, T. (2008). Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. The Accounting Review, 83(3), 757–787.
  • Cohen, D., Mashruwala, R., Zach, T. (2010). The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: Evidence from monthly data. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(4), 808–832.
  • Cohen, D. A., Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(1), 2–19.
  • DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review, 61(3), 400-420.
  • Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14 (1), 51–89.
  • Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36.
  • DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulations of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 145-176.
  • DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H., Sefcik, S. E. (2004). Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(1), 27-49.
  • Fields, T., Lyz, T., Vincent, L. (2001). Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1–3): 255–308.
  • Frankel, R., Kothari, S. P., Weber, J. (2006). Determinants of the informativeness of analyst research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2), 29–54.
  • Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1-3), 3-73.
  • Gu, F., Wang, W. (2005). Intangible assets, information complexity, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), 1673-1702.
  • Guidry, F., Leone, A. J., Rock, S. (1999). Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26(1-3), 113-142.
  • Hadani, M., Goranova, M., Khan, R. (2011). Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management. Journal of Business Research, 64(12), 1352–1360.
  • Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J. M., Nahata, R. (2012). Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 44–69.
  • Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.
  • Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. (1995). The challenges of investor communication. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(2), 111-140.
  • Healy, P. M., Wahlen, J. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365–383.
  • Herrmann, D., Inoue, T., Thomas, W. (2003). The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1), 89–108.
  • Hong, H., Kubik, J. D. (2003). Analyzing the analysts: career concerns and biased earnings forecasts. Journal of Finance, 58(1), 313–51.
  • Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., Solomon, A. (2000). Security analysts’ career concerns and the herding of earnings forecasts. Rand Journal of Economics, 31(1), 121–44.
  • Hribar, P., Jenkins, N., Johnson, W. (2006). Stock repurchases as an earnings management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1), 3–27.
  • Jackson, S., Wilcox, W. (2000). Do managers grant sales price reductions to avoid losses and declines in earnings and sales? Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 39(4), 3–20.
  • Jiambalvo, J., Noreen, E., Shevlin, T. (1997). Incremental information content of the change in the percent of production added to inventory. Contemporary Accounting Research, 14(1), 69-97.
  • Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193-228.
  • Kahn, J. (1987). Inventories and volatility of production. The American Economic Review, 77(4), 667-679.
  • Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 57-81.
  • Key, K. G. (1997). Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(3), 309-337.
  • Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375–400.
  • Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 105–231.
  • Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Starks, L. T., Wei, K. D., Yan, H. (2007). Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(2), 420-456.
  • Matsunaga, S. R., Park, C. W. (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review, 76(3), 313–332.
  • Mergenthaler, R. D., Rajgopal, S., Srinivasan, S. (2012). CEO and CFO career penalties to missing quarterly earnings forecasts. working Paper, Harvard Business School.
  • Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., Willis, R. H. (1997). Do security analysts improve their performance with experience? Journal of Accounting Research, 35, 131-157.
  • Mikhail, M., Walther, B., Willis, R. (2003). The effect of experience on security analyst underreaction. Journal of Accounting Economics, 35(1), 101–116.
  • Perry, S. E., Williams, T. H. (1994). Earnings management preceding management buyout offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(2), 157-179.
  • Plumlee, M. (2003). The effect of information complexity on analysts' use of that information. The Accounting Review, 78(1), 275-296.
  • Rangan, S. (1998). Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 101-122.
  • Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(3), 335-370.
  • Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizon, 3(4), 91–102.
  • Shivakumar, L. (2000). Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(3), 339-371.
  • Siegel, P., Lessard, J., Karim, K. (2011). Analyst forecast accuracy and firm growth. Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting, 9, 1-31.
  • Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., Wong, T. J. (1998a). Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935–1974.
  • Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., Wong, T. J. (1998b). Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 63-99.
  • Thomas, J. K., Zhang, H. (2002). Inventory changes and future returns. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2-3), 163–187.
  • Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings .Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61-91.
  • Watts, R. L., Zimmerman, J. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
  • Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N., DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the roles of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295–316.
  • Zang, A. Y. (2012). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. Accounting Review, 87(2), 675–703.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects Humanities, Multidisciplinary, Behavioral Sciences, Economics, Management, Business Finance
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Chen-miao LİN This is me (Primary Author)
0000-0002-4525-4405


Bingxuan LİN This is me


Henry SCHWARZBACH This is me

Publication Date March 30, 2019
Published in Issue Year 2019, Volume 8, Issue 1

Cite

Bibtex @research article { jbef543928, journal = {Journal of Business Economics and Finance}, issn = {}, eissn = {2146-7943}, address = {}, publisher = {PressAcademia}, year = {2019}, volume = {8}, pages = {17 - 27}, doi = {10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012}, title = {HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?}, key = {cite}, author = {Lin, Chen-miao and Lin, Bingxuan and Schwarzbach, Henry} }
APA Lin, C. , Lin, B. & Schwarzbach, H. (2019). HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY? . Journal of Business Economics and Finance , 8 (1) , 17-27 . DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012
MLA Lin, C. , Lin, B. , Schwarzbach, H. "HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?" . Journal of Business Economics and Finance 8 (2019 ): 17-27 <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/jbef/issue/44109/543928>
Chicago Lin, C. , Lin, B. , Schwarzbach, H. "HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?". Journal of Business Economics and Finance 8 (2019 ): 17-27
RIS TY - JOUR T1 - HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY? AU - Chen-miao Lin , Bingxuan Lin , Henry Schwarzbach Y1 - 2019 PY - 2019 N1 - doi: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012 DO - 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012 T2 - Journal of Business Economics and Finance JF - Journal JO - JOR SP - 17 EP - 27 VL - 8 IS - 1 SN - -2146-7943 M3 - doi: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012 UR - https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012 Y2 - 2019 ER -
EndNote %0 Journal of Business Economics and Finance HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY? %A Chen-miao Lin , Bingxuan Lin , Henry Schwarzbach %T HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY? %D 2019 %J Journal of Business Economics and Finance %P -2146-7943 %V 8 %N 1 %R doi: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012 %U 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012
ISNAD Lin, Chen-miao , Lin, Bingxuan , Schwarzbach, Henry . "HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?". Journal of Business Economics and Finance 8 / 1 (March 2019): 17-27 . https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012
AMA Lin C. , Lin B. , Schwarzbach H. HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?. JBEF. 2019; 8(1): 17-27.
Vancouver Lin C. , Lin B. , Schwarzbach H. HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?. Journal of Business Economics and Finance. 2019; 8(1): 17-27.
IEEE C. Lin , B. Lin and H. Schwarzbach , "HOW DOES INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AFFECT ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY?", Journal of Business Economics and Finance, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 17-27, Mar. 2019, doi:10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1012

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