Technology and State Relations: China Case

Abstract

This study explores the intricate relationship between technology and the state, with a specific focus on China's strategic technological advancements and their broader socio- political implications. By examining China's digital platforms—WeChat, TikTok, and Weibo—alongside the concepts of techno-economy, techno-nationalism, metamorphic thought, and platform sub-imperialism, the research provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how technological innovation serves as both a tool of state control and a driver of global influence. China's state-led strategies, such as the "dual circulation" policy and initiatives like "Made in China 2025," reveal a dual approach of fostering indigenous innovation while leveraging global market dynamics. These strategies are deeply intertwined with techno-nationalist ambitions that seek to achieve technological self-reliance, enhance national identity, and establish geopolitical dominance. Moreover, the study highlights the emergence of platform sub-imperialism, wherein Chinese digital platforms act as instruments of both regional control and global economic expansion. The analysis situates China's digital infrastructure within the global platform economy, emphasizing its role in reshaping power dynamics, economic systems, and cultural narratives. By integrating concepts like metamorphic thought, the study also sheds light on the transformative potential of technological systems to dismantle existing power structures while creating new forms of resistance and identity. Through comparative analysis, the research reveals how China's approach to technology not only challenges Western-led models of globalization but also redefines the role of technology in contemporary statecraft. The findings underscore the need to critically engage with the implications of state-driven technological innovation, particularly in the context of global inequality, digital sovereignty, and geopolitical competition.

Keywords

• Techno-economy
• Techno-nationalism
• Metamorphic thought
• China
• Sub-imperialism

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