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THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS IN STOCK MARKETS ON BOARD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF COMPANIES: AN APPLICATION ON BORSA ISTANBUL

Year 2019, Volume 6, Issue 3, 142 - 158, 30.09.2019
https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1113

Abstract

Purpose- Regulators seek to intervene directly or indirectly in the management styles and financial structures of companies in order to ensure the transparent and efficient functioning of the market, as well as to protect investors. The aim of the study is to determine the effect of corporate governance regulations in stock markets on board and capital structures of the industrial companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST).

Methodology- The study covers the period 2010-2014, including the period during which policy changes took place in Turkey. The sample consists of 134 companies listed in BIST Industry Index and traded continuously during this period. Non-parametric statistical tests are used for the effect of regulations on management structure, while the effect on capital structure is analyzed by panel regression analysis.

Findings- The results show that the regulations have a significant effect on establishment of an internal audit system, the inclusion of independent directors on board and board size. However, there is no statistically significant effect of the regulations on capital structures (leverage) on both pooled model and fixed effect models.

Conclusion- The evidence presented in the study suggests the necessity of the regulations and enforcements for public companies in the field of corporate governance. The results of the study are expected to shed light on not only researchers but also policy makers and regulatory bodies.

References

  • Abdallah, A. A.-N., & Ismail, A. K. (2017). Corporate governance practices, ownership structure, and corporate performance in the GCC countries. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 46 , 98-115.
  • Acaravcı, S. K., Kandır, S. Y., & Zelka, A. (2015). Kurumsal Yönetimin BIST Şirketlerinin Performanslarına Etkisinin Araştırılması. Niğde Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, Vol. 8(1) , 171 -183.
  • Achim, M.-V., & Borlea, S.-N. (2014). The Assessment of Corporate Governance System Quality in the Romanian Sectors. Analysis of the Companies Listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Procedia Economics and Finance, Vol.15 , 617-625.
  • Aksu, M., & Kösedağ, A. (2006). Transparency and Disclosure Scores and Their Determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 , 277-296.
  • Anderson, A., & Gupta, P. P. (1999). A cross-country comparison of corporate governance and firm performance: Do financial structure and the legal system matter? Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol.5(2) , 61-79.
  • Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1999). Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics. O. C. Ashenfelter, & D. Card Eds. in., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Part A (p. 1277-1366). North Holland: Elsevier.
  • Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries: evidence from India. Corporate Governance, Vol.16(2) , 420-436.
  • Arping, S., & Sautner, Z. (2010). Corporate governance and leverage: Evidence from a natural experiment. Finance Research Letters, Vol.7(2) , 127-134.
  • Arsov, S., & Bucevska, V. (2017). Determinants of transparency and disclosure – evidence from post-transition economies. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Vol. 30, No. 1 , 745-760.
  • Azeez, A. (2015). Corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from Sri Lanka. Journal of Finance and Bank Management, Vol.3(1) , 180-189.
  • Bauer, R., Guenster, N., & Otten, O. (2004). Empirical evidence on corporate governance in Europe: The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance. Journal of Asset Management, Vol.5(2) , 91-104.
  • Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol.1(1) , 101-124.
  • Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2013). Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.48(1) , 105-135.
  • BIST. (2019). Corporate Governance Index. Retrieved from https://www.borsaistanbul.com/en/indices/bist-stock-indices/corporate-governance-index
  • Black, B. S., de Carvalho, A. G., & Gorga, É. (2012). What matters and for which firms for corporate governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.18 , 934-952.
  • Cadbury Commitee. (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: Gee Publishing.
  • Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yo, S. S. (2007). The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.42(4) , 941-962.
  • CMB. (2019). CMB Communiqués. Retrieved from http://www.cmb.gov.tr/SiteApps/Teblig/Index/n
  • CMB. (2003, 2005). Corporate Governance Principles: Capital Markets Boards of Turkey. Retrieved from http://www.cmb.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/84
  • Cochran, W. (1950). The Comparison of Percentages in Matched Samples. Biometrika, Vol. 37, No. 3/4 , 256-266.
  • Detthamrong, U., Chancharat, N., & Vithessonthi, C. (2017). Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand. Research in International Business and Finance, Vol.42 , 689-709.
  • Durnev, A., & Kim, E. (2005). To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation. Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 3 , 1461-1493.
  • Eulerich, M., Kremin, J., & Wood, D. A. (2019). Factors that influence the perceived use of the internal audit function's work by executive management and audit committee. Advances in Accounting, Vol.45 , 1-7.
  • Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2 , 301-325.
  • Ferris, S. P., & Yan, X. (. (2007). Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.13(2-3) , 392-420.
  • Fleiss, J. L., Levin, B., & Paik, M. C. (2003). Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions, Third Edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Garay, U., & González, M. (2008). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of Venezuela. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 , 194-209.
  • Germain, L., Galy, N., & Lee, W. (2014). Corporate governance reform in Malaysia:Board size, independence and monitoring. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol.75 , 126-162.
  • Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1 , 107-155.
  • Grosman, A. (2015). Corporate Governance as a Mechanism to Mitigate Financing Constraints on Investment. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638434
  • Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management, Vol.20(4) , 101-112.
  • Jiraporn, P., Kim, J.-C., Kim, Y. S., & Kitsabunnarat, P. (2012). Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.22 , 208-221.
  • Johl, S. K., Kaur, S., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed firms. Journal of Economics, Business and Management, Vol.3(2) , 239-243.
  • KAP. (2019). KAP Public Disclosure Platform. Retrieved from https://www.kap.org.tr/en/Endeksler
  • Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies Interacting with U.S. Markets. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2 , 475-508.
  • Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 10, No. 5 , 703-728.
  • Kose, J., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.22(4) , 371-403.
  • Kumar, N., & Singh, J. (2013). Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: some empirical findings from India. Corporate Governance, Vol.13(1) , 88-98.
  • La Porta, R., De-Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113-1155.
  • Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). The market reaction to corporate governance regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.101(2) , 431-448.
  • Lou, W., & Fu, J. C. (2007). On exact Type I and Type II errors of Cochran's test. Statistics & Probability Letters, Vol.77(12) , 1282-1287.
  • Mahzan, N., & Yan, C. M. (2014). Harnessing the Benefits of Corporate Governance and Internal Audit: Advice to SME. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol.115 , 156-165.
  • Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2011). Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.17 , 1531-1557.
  • Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review, Vol.48 (3) , 261-297.
  • Monks, R. A., & Minow, N. (2004). Corporate Governance Third Edition. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Mura, R. (2007). Firm Performance: Do Non‐Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data. Financial Management, Vol.36(3) , 81-112.
  • Nadarajah, S., Ali, S., Liu, B., & Huang, A. (2018). Stock liquidity, corporate governance and leverage: New panel evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,Vol.50 , 216-234.
  • Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K., & Danbolt, J. (2012). The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 , 84-105.
  • OECD. (1999). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. OECD Publications Service.
  • OECD. (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. OECD Publications Service.
  • OECD. (2015). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm
  • Saha. (2019). Saha Rating Corporate Governance Rating Methodology. Retrieved from http://www.saharating.com/~saharati/en/services/corporate-governance-rating/corporate-governance-rating-methodology/
  • Sheskin, D. (2000). Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures 2nd Edition. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
  • Solomon, J., & Solomon, A. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • THEIAA. (n.d.). About Internal Auditing. Retrieved from https://global.theiia.org/about/about-internal-auditing/Pages/About-Internal-Auditing.aspx
  • Torres-Reyna, O. (2007). Panel Data Analysis. Fixed and Random Effects using Stata (v. 4.2). Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf
  • Tulung, J. E., & Ramdani, D. (2018). Independence, Size and Performance of the Board: An Emerging Market Research. Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol.15(2) , 201-208.
  • TUSIAD. (2002). Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice: Composition and Functioning of the Board of Directories. Retrieved from https://www.tusiad.org/en/reports/item/9238-corporate-governance-code-of-best-practice-composition-and-functioning-of-the-board-of-directories
  • Wang, M., & Hussainey, K. (2013). Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 32, Issue 3 , 26-49.
  • West, A. (2009). Corporate Governance Convergence and Moral Relativism. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.17, No.1 , 107-119.
  • Wintoki, M. B., & Xi, Y. (2019). Friendly directors and the cost of regulatory compliance. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.58 , 112-141.
  • Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.40 , 185-211.
  • Zhu, J., Ye, K., Tucker, J. W., & Chan, K. C. (2016). Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.41 , 262-279.

Year 2019, Volume 6, Issue 3, 142 - 158, 30.09.2019
https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1113

Abstract

References

  • Abdallah, A. A.-N., & Ismail, A. K. (2017). Corporate governance practices, ownership structure, and corporate performance in the GCC countries. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 46 , 98-115.
  • Acaravcı, S. K., Kandır, S. Y., & Zelka, A. (2015). Kurumsal Yönetimin BIST Şirketlerinin Performanslarına Etkisinin Araştırılması. Niğde Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, Vol. 8(1) , 171 -183.
  • Achim, M.-V., & Borlea, S.-N. (2014). The Assessment of Corporate Governance System Quality in the Romanian Sectors. Analysis of the Companies Listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Procedia Economics and Finance, Vol.15 , 617-625.
  • Aksu, M., & Kösedağ, A. (2006). Transparency and Disclosure Scores and Their Determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 , 277-296.
  • Anderson, A., & Gupta, P. P. (1999). A cross-country comparison of corporate governance and firm performance: Do financial structure and the legal system matter? Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol.5(2) , 61-79.
  • Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1999). Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics. O. C. Ashenfelter, & D. Card Eds. in., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Part A (p. 1277-1366). North Holland: Elsevier.
  • Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries: evidence from India. Corporate Governance, Vol.16(2) , 420-436.
  • Arping, S., & Sautner, Z. (2010). Corporate governance and leverage: Evidence from a natural experiment. Finance Research Letters, Vol.7(2) , 127-134.
  • Arsov, S., & Bucevska, V. (2017). Determinants of transparency and disclosure – evidence from post-transition economies. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Vol. 30, No. 1 , 745-760.
  • Azeez, A. (2015). Corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from Sri Lanka. Journal of Finance and Bank Management, Vol.3(1) , 180-189.
  • Bauer, R., Guenster, N., & Otten, O. (2004). Empirical evidence on corporate governance in Europe: The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance. Journal of Asset Management, Vol.5(2) , 91-104.
  • Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol.1(1) , 101-124.
  • Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2013). Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.48(1) , 105-135.
  • BIST. (2019). Corporate Governance Index. Retrieved from https://www.borsaistanbul.com/en/indices/bist-stock-indices/corporate-governance-index
  • Black, B. S., de Carvalho, A. G., & Gorga, É. (2012). What matters and for which firms for corporate governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.18 , 934-952.
  • Cadbury Commitee. (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: Gee Publishing.
  • Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yo, S. S. (2007). The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.42(4) , 941-962.
  • CMB. (2019). CMB Communiqués. Retrieved from http://www.cmb.gov.tr/SiteApps/Teblig/Index/n
  • CMB. (2003, 2005). Corporate Governance Principles: Capital Markets Boards of Turkey. Retrieved from http://www.cmb.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/84
  • Cochran, W. (1950). The Comparison of Percentages in Matched Samples. Biometrika, Vol. 37, No. 3/4 , 256-266.
  • Detthamrong, U., Chancharat, N., & Vithessonthi, C. (2017). Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand. Research in International Business and Finance, Vol.42 , 689-709.
  • Durnev, A., & Kim, E. (2005). To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation. Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 3 , 1461-1493.
  • Eulerich, M., Kremin, J., & Wood, D. A. (2019). Factors that influence the perceived use of the internal audit function's work by executive management and audit committee. Advances in Accounting, Vol.45 , 1-7.
  • Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2 , 301-325.
  • Ferris, S. P., & Yan, X. (. (2007). Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.13(2-3) , 392-420.
  • Fleiss, J. L., Levin, B., & Paik, M. C. (2003). Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions, Third Edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Garay, U., & González, M. (2008). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of Venezuela. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 , 194-209.
  • Germain, L., Galy, N., & Lee, W. (2014). Corporate governance reform in Malaysia:Board size, independence and monitoring. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol.75 , 126-162.
  • Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1 , 107-155.
  • Grosman, A. (2015). Corporate Governance as a Mechanism to Mitigate Financing Constraints on Investment. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638434
  • Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management, Vol.20(4) , 101-112.
  • Jiraporn, P., Kim, J.-C., Kim, Y. S., & Kitsabunnarat, P. (2012). Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.22 , 208-221.
  • Johl, S. K., Kaur, S., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed firms. Journal of Economics, Business and Management, Vol.3(2) , 239-243.
  • KAP. (2019). KAP Public Disclosure Platform. Retrieved from https://www.kap.org.tr/en/Endeksler
  • Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies Interacting with U.S. Markets. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2 , 475-508.
  • Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 10, No. 5 , 703-728.
  • Kose, J., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.22(4) , 371-403.
  • Kumar, N., & Singh, J. (2013). Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: some empirical findings from India. Corporate Governance, Vol.13(1) , 88-98.
  • La Porta, R., De-Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113-1155.
  • Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). The market reaction to corporate governance regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.101(2) , 431-448.
  • Lou, W., & Fu, J. C. (2007). On exact Type I and Type II errors of Cochran's test. Statistics & Probability Letters, Vol.77(12) , 1282-1287.
  • Mahzan, N., & Yan, C. M. (2014). Harnessing the Benefits of Corporate Governance and Internal Audit: Advice to SME. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol.115 , 156-165.
  • Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2011). Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.17 , 1531-1557.
  • Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review, Vol.48 (3) , 261-297.
  • Monks, R. A., & Minow, N. (2004). Corporate Governance Third Edition. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Mura, R. (2007). Firm Performance: Do Non‐Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data. Financial Management, Vol.36(3) , 81-112.
  • Nadarajah, S., Ali, S., Liu, B., & Huang, A. (2018). Stock liquidity, corporate governance and leverage: New panel evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,Vol.50 , 216-234.
  • Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K., & Danbolt, J. (2012). The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 , 84-105.
  • OECD. (1999). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. OECD Publications Service.
  • OECD. (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. OECD Publications Service.
  • OECD. (2015). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm
  • Saha. (2019). Saha Rating Corporate Governance Rating Methodology. Retrieved from http://www.saharating.com/~saharati/en/services/corporate-governance-rating/corporate-governance-rating-methodology/
  • Sheskin, D. (2000). Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures 2nd Edition. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
  • Solomon, J., & Solomon, A. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • THEIAA. (n.d.). About Internal Auditing. Retrieved from https://global.theiia.org/about/about-internal-auditing/Pages/About-Internal-Auditing.aspx
  • Torres-Reyna, O. (2007). Panel Data Analysis. Fixed and Random Effects using Stata (v. 4.2). Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf
  • Tulung, J. E., & Ramdani, D. (2018). Independence, Size and Performance of the Board: An Emerging Market Research. Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol.15(2) , 201-208.
  • TUSIAD. (2002). Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice: Composition and Functioning of the Board of Directories. Retrieved from https://www.tusiad.org/en/reports/item/9238-corporate-governance-code-of-best-practice-composition-and-functioning-of-the-board-of-directories
  • Wang, M., & Hussainey, K. (2013). Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 32, Issue 3 , 26-49.
  • West, A. (2009). Corporate Governance Convergence and Moral Relativism. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.17, No.1 , 107-119.
  • Wintoki, M. B., & Xi, Y. (2019). Friendly directors and the cost of regulatory compliance. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.58 , 112-141.
  • Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.40 , 185-211.
  • Zhu, J., Ye, K., Tucker, J. W., & Chan, K. C. (2016). Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.41 , 262-279.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects Management
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Cuneyd Ebrar LEVENT> (Primary Author)

0000-0003-1494-3029

Publication Date September 30, 2019
Published in Issue Year 2019, Volume 6, Issue 3

Cite

APA Levent, C. E. (2019). THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS IN STOCK MARKETS ON BOARD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF COMPANIES: AN APPLICATION ON BORSA ISTANBUL . Journal of Economics Finance and Accounting , 6 (3) , 142-158 . DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1113

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