INDIA: IS IT TIME TO GO PRESIDENTIAL?

Year 2022, Issue: 5, 2 - 23, 31.08.2022

Ramachandra Byrappa

Abstract

Indian democracy has come of age, and it is probably time to abandon the colonial heritage as far as its parliamentary system is concerned. Transactionality is the name of the game in India’s parliamentary system, where the principle of representation is fast fading. The art of coherent electoral manifestos and democratic debate on the policy promises it contains is a distant reality. The democratic debate and electioneering is replaced by vote banks, MPs crossing the floor, personality cult and other deification of political leaders through social media hammering. The end result is the loss of morality among parliamentarians, transforming the legislature into a financial clearing house. The situation is further worsened by two other problems related to the parliamentary process in India. The first among these two problems is political consensus. National development, economic and social needs, demand a broad consensus and popular affirmation on a few central policies and issues to move this gigantic country forward through the next few decades that are going to be very difficult. The only Indian statesperson that could build such a consensus was Indira Gandhi. Today India is divided and confused with no clarity of purpose, dogmatic leadership cannot replace charismatic statesmanship. The other problem is that in the best of colonial traditions, India is centralized bureaucratically but splintered politically. The parliamentary system is unable to streamline federal institutions towards one politically unifying and unified National Interest. One can therefore legitimately ask a very simple question: Is it time to make a leap towards a Presidential system, where the President is directly elected through universal suffrage? Could this help give India one national figure, one clean voice and one articulation of the National Interest?

Keywords

Liberal democracy, Westminster model, capitalist-candidate, transactional-democracy

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