THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP ON BEHAVIOR OF DIVIDEND PAYERS

Abstract

The objectives of this study are to give empirical evidences about cash cow firms and free cash flow theory. Conducting compare means paired samples t test and logistic regression with samples of 141 firms which listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2009 to 2014, this study proves dividend payers in Indonesia are not cash cows and ownership has role in determining behavior behind dividend policy. Firms with individuals and/or public ownership both for larger and smaller size shall pay dividends for some other intentions, but firms with institutional and/or state ownership concerns with its size shall pay dividends because : first, they are not at cash cows status or not under circumstance of internal conflict; second, they shall behave like cash cows in order of conflict avoidance 

Keywords

• Dividend Payers,Cash Cows,Free Cash Flow Theory,Ownership,Size

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