Counterinsurgency Policy in Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Year 2016, Volume: 4 Issue: 1, 19 - 25, 16.01.2016

Recep Arpat , Gökhan Akcesme

https://doi.org/10.17858/jmisci.69367

Abstract

The Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on 20 March 2003 to move the regime of Saddam and help Iraqi people to rebuild allegedly new Iraq. The outcomes of the operations show us that plans and preparations were done in a hasty mood with a lack of contingency plans. The role given to civilian agencies to work with new Baghdad regime in the post war era weren’t implemented successfully. The post war period’s desired endstates weren’t achieved as were planned theoretically. What were the assumptions of CENTCOM before the OPLAN 1003? On which bases did the counterinsurgency policy rely on? What was the reaction of Iraqi people against OIF army? How does this policy effect the desired endstate? The aim of this article is to reply the mentioned questions above. This paper seeks to show the weaknesses of counterinsurgency policy pursed in OIF and the measures taken in wake of the failure. Finally the lessons learnt are depicted and suggestions are given.  

Keywords

Counterinsurgency, Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, OPLAN 1003, Policy

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