Önleyici Saldırının Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Stratejisi Olarak Kullanılması

Abstract

Nükleer silahların yayılmasını önlemek için uygulanan stratejilerden biri de nükleer programa sahip bir devletin nükleer tesis ve araçlarına yönelik önleyici saldırı gerçekleştirilmesidir. Bu çalışmada, önleyici saldırının hangi koşullarda nükleer silah geliştirilmesinin engellenmesi amacıyla stratejik bir seçenek olarak uygulandığı incelenmiştir. Çalışmada, önleyici saldırıyı uygulayacak olan bir devletin böyle bir eylemi gerçekleştirecek siyasi motivasyonunun yanında önleyici saldırı kapasitesine de sahip olması gerektiği ileri sürülmektedir. Önleyici saldırı kapasitesi, caydırıcı ve saldırı askeri kuvvetleri ile etkili istihbarat ve karşı istihbarat unsurlarını içermektedir. Çalışmada öne sürülen bu önermeler, olumlu ve olumsuz olmak üzere iki farklı örnek vaka üzerinden değerlendirilmektedir. Bu vakalar, İsrail’in 2007 yılında Suriye’ye yönelik düzenlediği önleyici saldırı ve 1993-1994 yıllarında gelişen Birinci Kuzey Kore Nükleer Krizinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Kuzey Kore’ye karşı önleyici saldırı seçeneğini düşünmesine rağmen uygulamaması durumudur. Çalışmada, önermede belirtilen uygun koşulların oluşması durumunda önleyici saldırının nükleer silah geliştirilmesinin engellenmesine yönelik bir eylem olarak tercih edilebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Keywords

• Önleyici saldırı
• nükleer silahların yayılmasını önleme stratejileri
• Kuzey Kore
• İsrail

Using Preventive Strike As A Nuclear Non-Proliferation Strategy

Abstract

One of the strategies applied to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to carry out a preventive strike on the nuclear facilities of a state with a nuclear program. In this study, under which conditions a preventive strike is used as a strategic option to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons are examined. The study argues that a state that considers implementing a preventive strike against another state should have the capacity of the preventive strike and the political motivation to carry out such an action. Preventive strike capacity includes deterrent and offensive military forces, effective intelligence, and counterintelligence elements. These propositions put forward in the study evaluate through two different case studies as a positive and negative case. These are Israel's preventive attack on Syria in 2007 and the United States' decision not to implement a preventive strike option against North Korea during the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-1994. The study concludes that when the appropriate conditions specified in the proposition are met, the preventive attack can be preferred as an option to curb the development of nuclear weapons.

Keywords

• Preventive strike
• nuclear non-proliferation strategies
• North Korea
• Israel

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