Research Article
BibTex RIS Cite

Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?

Year 2024, , 287 - 306, 30.06.2024
https://doi.org/10.47425/marifetname.vi.1468172

Abstract

This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moore’s moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moore's narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moore's claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individual’s mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moore's arguments.

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33/124 (1958), 1–19.
  • Bagnoli, Carla. “Constructivism in Metaethics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. Edward N. Zalta. Accessed March 28, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/constructivism-metaethics/ Berker, Selim. “Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist.” Philosophical Perspectives 33 (2019), 5–25.
  • Brink, David Oven. Moral Realism And The Foundations of Ethics. USA: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
  • Harman, Gilbert. “Is There a Single True Morality?” Explaining Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Is Moral Realism.” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 855–863.
  • Harman, Gilbert - Thomson, Judith. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
  • Kuçuradi, İoanna. İnsan ve Değerleri. İstanbul: Yankı Yayınları, 1971.
  • Landau, Russ-Shafer. Moral Realism. USA: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Mackie, John L. “A Refutation of Morals.” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24/1–2 (1946), 77–90.
  • Mackie, John L. Ethics Inventing Right And Wrong. England: Penguin Books, 1990.
  • Moore, George Edward. “A Defence of Common Sense.” Philosophical Papers. USA: Routledge, 2013.
  • Moore, George Edward. Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Moore, George Edward. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
  • Moore, George Edward. “The Refutation of Idealism.” G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. ed. Thomas Baldwin. New York: Routledge, 1993.
  • Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. ed. Stuart Rachels. USA: McGraw-Hill, 7th Ed., 2012.
  • Russell, Bruce. “Moral Relativism and Moral Realism.” The Monist 67/3 (1984), 435–451.
  • Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
  • Stocker, Michael. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 73/14 (1976), 453–466. Timmons, Mark. Moral Theory An Introduction. UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2nd Ed., 2013.
  • Westacott, Emrys. “Moral Relativism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed March 26, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/

Moore’un Ahlaki Nesnellik Argümanı Ahlaki Göreceliğe Karşı Yeterli Mi?

Year 2024, , 287 - 306, 30.06.2024
https://doi.org/10.47425/marifetname.vi.1468172

Abstract

Bu makale Moore’un ahlaki görecelik ve öznelciliğe karşı ahlaki nesnelci argümanının zayıf olarak değerlendirilebilecek bazı yönlerini ele almaktadır. Bununla beraber çalışma, ahlaki nesnelci bir argümanın, ahlaki göreceliğe karşı ahlaki çeşitliliği açıklaması gerektiğini öne sürmektedir. Ahlaki görecelik metaetik alanındaki en kritik tartışmalardan biridir. Ahlaki görecelik; ahlaki gerçekçi ve ahlaki karşı-gerçekçi olarak iki farklı şekilde anlaşılabilir. Ahlaki gerçekçilik, ahlaki nesnelciliğe indirgendiğinde, ahlaki görecelik ve öznelcilik, ahlaki gerçekçiliğin dışında kalır. Çalışmada, bu yorum daraltılmış ahlaki gerçekçilik olarak adlandırılmıştır. Ancak ahlaki gerçekçilik ahlaki öznelcilik ve görecelik gibi kapsayıcı bir yolla genişletilebilir. Buna da genişletilmiş ahlaki gerçekçilik adı verilmiştir. Çalışmanın odağı sebebiyle giriş kısmında her ikisi de tanıtılacaktır. Ardından G. E. Moore’un daraltılmış ahlaki gerçekçiliği ele alınacaktır. Onun argümanları, ahlaki kodların çeşitliliğini açıklamadaki başarısızlığı yönüyle kritik edilecektir. Son olarak, ahlaki öznelcilik ve ahlaki göreceliğin genişletilmiş ahlaki gerçekçilik olarak ele alınabileceği öne sürülmektedir. Bu nedenle, Moore’un iddialarına rağmen ahlaki görecelik ve ahlaki öznelciliğin ahlaki gerçekçi iddialar olacağı savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca iki ana iddia da ahlaki gerçekçilik açısından değerlendirilmektedir: 1) Ahlaki öznelcilik, ahlaki gerçekliğin bireyin zihinsel durumu tarafından inşa edildiğini iddia eder. 2) Ahlaki görecelik, sosyal kodların tamamen ahlaki gerçekliği belirlediğini savunur. Birinci bölümde ahlaki görecelik, nesnel ahlakın temelinde apaçık ve tanımlanamaz gerçekler olduğunu savunan Moore’cu bir perspektiften tartışılmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Moore’un haklı olması durumunda, farklı kültürlerin neden farklı ahlaki kodları kabul ettiğini açıklaması gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise Moore'un buna yönelik herhangi bir açıklama sunmadığını ileri sürmektedir. Sonuç kısmında ahlaki görecelik ve ahlaki öznelciliğin Moore’un argümanlarının başarısızlığından yola çıkarak ahlaki gerçekçi teoriler olarak görülebileceği iddia edilmektedir.

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33/124 (1958), 1–19.
  • Bagnoli, Carla. “Constructivism in Metaethics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. Edward N. Zalta. Accessed March 28, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/constructivism-metaethics/ Berker, Selim. “Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist.” Philosophical Perspectives 33 (2019), 5–25.
  • Brink, David Oven. Moral Realism And The Foundations of Ethics. USA: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
  • Harman, Gilbert. “Is There a Single True Morality?” Explaining Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Is Moral Realism.” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 855–863.
  • Harman, Gilbert - Thomson, Judith. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
  • Kuçuradi, İoanna. İnsan ve Değerleri. İstanbul: Yankı Yayınları, 1971.
  • Landau, Russ-Shafer. Moral Realism. USA: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Mackie, John L. “A Refutation of Morals.” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24/1–2 (1946), 77–90.
  • Mackie, John L. Ethics Inventing Right And Wrong. England: Penguin Books, 1990.
  • Moore, George Edward. “A Defence of Common Sense.” Philosophical Papers. USA: Routledge, 2013.
  • Moore, George Edward. Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Moore, George Edward. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
  • Moore, George Edward. “The Refutation of Idealism.” G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. ed. Thomas Baldwin. New York: Routledge, 1993.
  • Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. ed. Stuart Rachels. USA: McGraw-Hill, 7th Ed., 2012.
  • Russell, Bruce. “Moral Relativism and Moral Realism.” The Monist 67/3 (1984), 435–451.
  • Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
  • Stocker, Michael. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 73/14 (1976), 453–466. Timmons, Mark. Moral Theory An Introduction. UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2nd Ed., 2013.
  • Westacott, Emrys. “Moral Relativism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed March 26, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/
There are 19 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects History of Philosophy (Other)
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Burhan Başarslan 0000-0001-9459-373X

Publication Date June 30, 2024
Submission Date April 14, 2024
Acceptance Date June 11, 2024
Published in Issue Year 2024

Cite

ISNAD Başarslan, Burhan. “Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?”. Marifetname 11/1 (June 2024), 287-306. https://doi.org/10.47425/marifetname.vi.1468172.

Marifetname Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası Lisansı (CC BY NC) ile lisanslanmıştır.