Black Sea Synergy: Success or Failure for the European Union?

Year 2017, Volume: 5 Issue: Özel Sayı Nisan 2017 , 83 - 94 , 10.05.2017

Hatice Yazgan

https://izlik.org/JA73KA48MG

Abstract

Black Sea Region has been extensively on the agenda of the European Union (EU) since Romania and

Bulgaria’s membership in 2007. In 2008 the EU created “Black Sea Synergy” as a regional initiative in

order to develop cooperation in the region in certain areas such as energy, transport and environment.

Countries that take part in the Black Sea Synergy, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

are also part of “Eastern Partnership” which is another initiative simultaneously established with “Black

Sea Synergy” as a part of the wider policy “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). Besides some

EU member states, Turkey, an official candidate country to the EU since 1999, and Russia, a so-called

strategic partner of the EU are significant actors in the “Black Sea Synergy” initiative although they

are not included in ENP. The initiative comprises various common practices with similar initiatives

of the EU, such as providing financial assistance, supporting economic development and stability as

well as encouraging economic and democratic reforms. Although the EU attempts to take initiative in

solving the conflicts and increase security in the region, it has significant deficiencies in conducting

these policies as the literature indicates. This article aims to analyse the “Black Sea Synergy” in light of

the recent developments regarding Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the EU and Russia’s annexation

of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. The article attempts to answer “to what extent do

these developments affect “Black Sea Synergy”? and argues that, although the “Black Sea Synergy” is

an initiative mainly comprising technical projects in some key sectors, the crisis in Ukraine and the

relations between Turkey and the EU have exacerbated the “challenge” confronted by the EU in terms

of implementing the objectives of the initiative. Obviously the political development of the “Black Sea

Synergy” continues to be dependent on reciprocal relations between the EU, Russia and Turkey in light

of the current events. However the technical character of the Black Sea Synergy has the potential to

maintain the contacts between the partners despite the political disagreements among them. All in all,

a cooperative environment with Turkey and Russia will provide a common ground for achieving the

EU’s general objectives in the Black Sea region despite the prevalence of structural deficiencies of the

EU as a foreign policy actor.

Keywords

Black Sea , Black Sea Synergy , EU , Russia , Turkey

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