Yanılsamanın Akla Yatkınlığı: Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi, Özgür İrade ve Ahlaki Sorumluluk

Year 2021, , 31 - 51, 30.06.2021

Kadir Kütükoğlu

https://doi.org/10.51404/metazihin.898110

Abstract

Alternatif olanaklar ilkesi (–ki “PAP” olarak da adlandırılabilmektedir), genellikle bağdaşmazcı özgür irade ve başka türlü yapma olanağı kavrayışlarını tanıtlamak amacıyla çekirdek bir argüman içerisinde birinci öncül olarak kullanılır. Bu ilke, “Kişi ancak başka türlü yapabilseydi eyleminden ahlaki anlamda sorumlu olurdu” anlamına gelir. Söz konusu bağdaşmazcı çekirdek argümana karşı-cevap üretmek için Harry Frankfurt, 1969’da bir makale yayınladı. Onun çıkarımlarını ortaya koyma biçimi birtakım karşı-olgusal düşünce deneylerine dayanıyordu. Bu sayede alternatif olanaklar ilkesinin nasıl çürütülebilir olduğunu gösterecekti. Söz konusu makale, sırasıyla şu dikkat çekici düşünceleri içeriyordu: (1) Özgür irade alternatif olanakları gerektirmez. (2) Kişi başka türlü yapma olanağından mahrum olsa bile eyleminden ahlaki anlamda sorumlu olabilir. (3) Zorlama ahlaki sorumluluğu dışlamaz. Bu çalışma ilkin, “PAP”ye ilişkin bir çözümleme sağlarken sonrasında Frankfurt’un taraf tuttuğu konum nezdinde bağdaşırcılığın gözden geçirilmiş bir tanımı gerektirdiği önerisinde bulunmaktadır.

Keywords

Harry Frankfurt, alternatif olanaklar ilkesi, özgür irade, başka türlü yapma olanağı, nedensel belirlenimcilik, bağdaşırcılık, bağdaşmazcılık, ahlaki sorumluluk

The Plausibility of Illusion: The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

The principle of alternate possibilities (it may also be called the “PAP”) is often used as the first premise in a core argument to prove that the incompatibilist accounts of free will and the ability to do otherwise. And what that means is that “An agent is morally responsible for what he/she has done, only if he/she could have done otherwise.” In counter-response to this argument, Harry Frankfurt has issued an article in 1969. The way he came up with his conclusions were based on various counterfactual thought experiments. In this way, he was going to show how the principle of alternate possibilities can be falsified. The paper in question contained the following striking thoughts: (1) Free will does not entail (imply) alternate possibilities. (2) An agent can be morally responsible for what he/she has done even though he/she could not have done otherwise. (3) Coercion does not exclude moral responsibility. This study first gives an analysis of the “PAP,” then proposes that the version of compatibilism which Frankfurt defends requires a revised description.

Keywords

Harry Frankfurt, the principle of alternate possibilities, free will, the ability to do otherwise, causal determinism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, moral responsibility, coercion

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