Bilincin Bir Yanılsama Olduğu Düşüncesi Üzerine Bir İnceleme: Bir İllüzyon Olmak Nasıl Bir Şeydir?

Year 2022, Volume: 5 Issue: 2, 93 - 118, 30.12.2022

Erol Sungur , Dursun Akyasan

https://doi.org/10.51404/metazihin.1152743

Abstract

Yanılsamacılık (illüzyonizm) düşüncesi fenomenal bilincin var olmadığını savunur. Buna göre bilince atfedilen fenomenal özellikler sadece aldatıcı görünüşlerden ibarettir. Öznel deneyim sadece bir yanılsamadır. Bu nedenle biz hiçbir türden öznel deneyime sahip değiliz, sadece öznel deneyimin yanıltıcı bir algısına sahibiz. Fenomenal bilinç gerçek olmadığı için bilinç hakkında açıklanması gereken şey fiziksel bir organizmanın nasıl olup da bilinç sahibi olduğu değil, öyle olmadığımız halde neden kendimizi bilinçli olarak algıladığımızdır. Cevaplanması gereken soru nasıl fenomenal deneyime sahip olduğumuz değil, neden fenomenal deneyime sahip gibi göründüğümüzdür. Soruyu bu şekilde sorduğumuzda bilincin zor problemi yerini yanılsama problemine bırakmaktadır. Yanılsamacılık, bilinçle ilgili araştırmalar için teorik bir çerçeve olarak öne sürülmektedir. Bu düşünce, fenomenal deneyimin fiziksel açıklamasının onun aslında bir yanılsamadan ibaret olduğu şeklinde bir teorik çerçeve içinde yapılmaya çalışılmasının, sorunu paradoksal yapısından kurtaracağını savunmaktadır. Bu makalede yanılsamacı argümanların ve bazı teorik yaklaşımların incelenmesi yoluyla yanılsamacı düşüncenin içsel yapısını ortaya koyacağız. Böylece yanılsamacılığın, bilinç paradoksu adını verdiğimiz muammayı nasıl ele aldığına dair bir anlayış geliştirmeye çalışacağız. Diğer taraftan, yapısal nitelikleri bakımından indirgemeci fizikalist yaklaşımların yanılsamacı özellikler taşıdıklarını açıklayacağız. Sonuç olarak, bilincin zor probleminin karakteristik olarak paradoksal olduğu ve yanılsamacılığın bilince bakış açısının Zenon’un hareket ve zaman hakkındaki kanaatleri ile ortak yönlere sahip olduğu açıklanmış olacaktır.

Keywords

zihin-beden problemi, bilinç, deneyim, fenomenal, yanılsama, paradoks, fizikalizm

An Examination on the Idea That Consciousness is an Illusion: What Is It Like to Be an Illusion?

Abstract

Illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. Accordingly, the phenomenal features attributed to consciousness are only deceptive appearances. The subjective experience is a mere illusion. So, we do not have any kind of subjective experience, just an illusive perception of it. Since phenomenal consciousness is not real, what needs to be explained about consciousness is not how a physical organism comes to be conscious, but why we perceive ourselves to be phenomenally conscious though we are not. The question to be answered is not how we have phenomenal experience, but why we seem to have phenomenal experience. When we ask the question in this way, the hard problem of consciousness leaves its place to the problem of illusion. Illusionism has been proposed as a theoretical framework for research on consciousness. This idea argues that trying to make the physical explanation of the phenomenal experience within a theoretical framework that it is just an illusion will save the problem from its paradoxical structure. In this article, we will reveal the internal structure of illusionism through the examination of illusionist arguments and some theoretical approaches. Thus, we will try to reach an understanding of how illusionism deals with the enigma that we call consciousness paradox. On the other hand, we will explain that reductive physicalist approaches have similar features to those of illusionism in terms of their structural characteristics. Consequently, it will be explained that the hard problem of consciousness is characteristically paradoxical and illusionism’s point of view on consciousness has common aspects with Zeno’s convictions about motion and time.

Keywords

mind-body problem, consciousness, experience, phenomenal, illusion, paradox, physicalism

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