Axel Honneth’in Tanınma Kuramının Hegelci Kökleri

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth’in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel’in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth’in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth’in Hegel’den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel’in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel’in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel’in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel’in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena Fenomenolojisi olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır.

Keywords

• Disinformation
• insincere speech
• epistemic responsibility

Hegelian Roots of Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition

Abstract

This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel’s opinions on the idea of recognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, and how later philosophers writing on recognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel’s intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel’s point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth’s theory of recognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation between Honneth’s and Hegel’s theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel’s Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel’s Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of the recognition on the Phenomenology of Spirit and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests that recognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena Phenomenology, dated as the end of the Jena period.

Keywords

• Honneth
• Hegel
• recognition
• intersubjectivity

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