HUKUK, SİYASET VE UZUN DÖNEMLİ İKTİSADİ GELİŞME

Abstract

HUKUK, SİYASET VE UZUN DÖNEMLİ İKTİSADİ GELİŞME

Abstract

This article reviews the works in the New Institutional Economics Literature that investigate the impact of law and politics on long term economic development. The importance of this literature lies in its innovative use of mathematical modeling and empirical analysis to investigate social mechanisms that until recently mainstream economics had stayed away from. The review of the literature highlights the promise of this approach to provide a unified, comprehensive and flexible theoretical framework to study development and more generally the interactions between different social processes. The article also summarizes the debates in the literature regarding the roles of law and politics in the development process

Keywords

• Institutional economics, economic development, political economy

HUKUK, SİYASET VE UZUN DÖNEMLİ İKTİSADİ GELİŞME

Abstract

Bu makale, Yeni Kurumsal İktisat literatürü kapsamında hukuk ve siyasetin uzun dönemli gelişmeye etkisini inceleyen çalışmaları ele alacaktır. Bu literatürün önemi, iktisatta yaygın olarak kullanılan matematiksel modelleme ve ampirik sınama yöntemlerini, iktisat biliminin uzun bir süre mesafeli durduğu gelişmenin temelinde yatan toplumsal kurumları anlama amacı için kullanmasıdır. Ele alınan çalışmalar, bu metodolojik yaklaşımın, gerek özel olarak gelişme konusunda, gerekse daha genel olarak sosyal süreçler arasındaki etkileşimleri modelleme açısından, ortak, kapsayıcı ve esnek bir teorik çerçeve oluşturma potansiyeli taşıdığını gösterir. Makale ayrıca hukuk ve siyasetin iktisadi gelişmeyi belirlemedeki nispi önemleri ve gelişmeye etkilerini hangi mekanizmalar üzerinden gösterdiklerine dair literatürde devam eden tartışmaları değerlendirecektir

Keywords

• iktisadi gelişme,siyasal iktisat,Kurumsal iktisat

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