POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY: 1977-2001

Year 2014, , 185 - 213, 16.03.2015

Yasemin Gezgin

https://doi.org/10.14780/iibd.84728

Abstract

This study is about political business cycles (PBC) and investigates the Turkish case in the 1977-2001 period. The PBC literature has been developed in the last four-five decades and links economics and politics in several ways. In the first part of the study, developments in the literature are mentioned and the link between New Classical Economics and New Political Economics is introduced. In the second part, Turkish case is analyzed in details to determine whether there have been PBC during the above mentioned period. The results show that there have been political cycles in some macroeconomic variables which are currency issued, broad money (M1), public sector credits and agricultural credits extended by Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), and tax revenues. CBRT has not allowed PBC especially on the targeted variables (CBRT balance sheet size, net domestic assets and monetary base), after 1989. Due to the high legal ceilings of CBRT credits to the public sector, CBRT was not able to limit those credits, especially before 1991 general elections. There had been similar PBC on agricultural credits which had been extended in the 1977-1991 period by CBRT. In addition to the regression analysis, comparative tables and figures for personnel expenditures of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), agricultural credits which had been extended by Agricultural Bank of the Republic of Turkey (ABRT) in the 1964-1998 period and agricultural prices which had been declared by governments in the 1986-1999 period are provided in the paper. The study provides some evidence to PBC literature and determines which policy instruments could have been used to produce PBC in the Turkish economy. And it is also important to learn which policies can be manipulated in order to prevent the PBC in the future

Keywords

Political business cycles, Autoregression analysis, Time series analysis, Structural breaks, Dummy variables, Turkish economy

TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİNDE POLİTİK DEVRESEL HAREKETLER: 1977-2001

Abstract

Bu çalışma, politik devresel hareketlerle (PDH) ilgili olup, 1977-2001 döneminde Türkiye’de PDH’yi araştırmaktadır. PDH literatürü son 40-50 yılda gelişmiş olup, iktisadı ve politikayı çeşitli yönlerden birbirine bağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde literatürdeki gelişmelere değinilmiş ve Yeni Klasik İktisat ile Yeni Politik İktisat arasındaki bağ tanıtılmıştır. İkinci bölümde, söz konusu dönem için PDH olup olmadığına ilişkin detaylı bir Türkiye analizi yer almaktadır. Sonuçlara göre emisyon, dar anlamda para arzı (M1), Merkez Bankası’nca verilen kamu sektörü kredileri ve tarımsal krediler, vergi gelirleri gibi bazı makro değişkenlerde PDH bulunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Merkez Bankası 1989’dan itibaren özellikle hedef değişkenlerde (TCMB bilanço büyüklüğü, net yurt içi varlıklar, parasal taban)PDH’ye izin vermemiştir. Merkez bankasının kamu sektörüne yönelik kredilerindeki yüksek yasal tavanlar dolayısıyla özellikle 1991 genel seçimlerine kadar Merkez Bankası, bu kredilere sınırlandırma getirememiştir. Benzer PDH 1977-1991 döneminde açılan tarımsal kredilerde de yaşanmıştır. Çalışmada regresyon analizine ek olarak, Kamu İktisadi Kuruluşlarının personel harcamalarının, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası’nca 1964-1998 döneminde açılan tarımsal krediler, 1986-1999 döneminde hükümetlerce açıklanan tarımsal fiyatlara ilişkin karşılaştırmalı tablo ve figürler de yer almaktadır. Çalışma PDH literatürüne bir miktar katkı sağlamakta ve Türkiye ekonomisinde PDH’ye neden olabilecek politika araçlarını belirlemektedir. Ayrıca, seçim öncesinde hangi politikaların manipüle edilebileceğini öğrenmek, gelecekte PDH yaşanmasını önlemek için önemli görünmektedir. 

Keywords

Politik devresel hareketler, otoregresyon analizi, zaman serisi analizi, yapısal kırılmalar, kukla değişkenler, Türkiye ekonomisi

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