İSTİHBARATIN DENETİMİ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ

Year 2022, , 42 - 51, 27.06.2022

Ahmet Ateş

https://doi.org/10.55580/oguzhan.1114951

Abstract

İstihbarat örgütlerinin denetimi tehdit parametreleri ve içinde bulundukları kurumsal kültürün yanı sıra ülkelerinin rejim türüne göre de şekillenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, kapsamlı bir literatür taraması ve ilgili açık kaynak istihbarat dokümanlarının incelenmesi gerçekleştirilerek demokrasiler ve otoriter rejimlerde gerçekleştirilen istihbaratın denetimi karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Yapılan çalışma sonucunda demokratik ve otoriter rejimlerde istihbaratın denetiminin temel olarak iki noktada farklılık gösterdiği tespit edilmiştir. Bunlar amaç farklılığı ve denetim mekanizması farklılığıdır. Amaç farklılığı noktasında demokratik ve otoriter rejimler arasındaki en temel ayrımı yasalara uygunluk denetimi ve toplum/rejim güvenliği amacı oluşturduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Demokratik ülkelerde istihbarat denetimi, gerçekleştirilen faaliyetlerin kişisel haklar, ulusal ve uluslararası hukuka uygunluğunun incelenmesini içermekteyken, bu durumun otoriter rejimlerde sembolik bir süreci ifade ettiği tespit edilmiştir. Demokratik ve otoriter rejimlerdeki amaç farklılığından kaynaklanan pratiklerin kurumsallaşması sonucu denetim mekanizmalarının etkinliğinin de farklılaştığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, günümüzde demokrasilerin daha etkin ve kurumsal istihbarat denetim mekanizmalarına sahip olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Aradaki farkı oluşturan unsurların ise etkin denetim yetkisi ve sivil kontrol ile uzmanlaşma olduğu belirlenmiştir.

Keywords

İstihbarat, Denetim, Demokrasi, Otoriter Rejimler

OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

The oversight of intelligence organizations is determined by the threat parameters and the institutional culture they belong to, and the regime types of the countries. This article comparatively analyses intelligence oversight in democracies and authoritarian regimes with a comprehensive literature review and an examination of the relevant open-source intelligence documents. As a result of the study, it has been found that the oversight of intelligence in democratic and authoritarian regimes differs mainly in two points. These are the difference of purpose and the difference of oversight mechanisms. It concludes that the most fundamental distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes in terms of purpose difference is the oversight of compliance with the law and the purpose of society/regime security. While intelligence oversight in democratic countries includes examining the compliance of the activities with individual rights, national and international law, this situation represents a symbolic process in authoritarian regimes. The article also reveals that the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms varies due to the institutionalization of the practices arising from the difference in purpose in democratic and authoritarian regimes. In this regard, the article also demonstrates that democracies today have more effective and institutional intelligence oversight mechanisms. It argues that the factors that make up the difference are effective oversight authority, civilian control and specialization

Keywords

Intelligence, Oversight, Democracy, Authoritarian regimes

References

• Andregg, M. M., & Gill, P. (2014). Comparing the democratization of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 29(4), 487-497.
• Ateş, A. (2020). Understanding the Change in Intelligence: An Institutional Framework. (Yayımlanmamış doktora tezi). University of Delaware, Newark, DE, ABD.
• Bruneau, T. C., & Dombroski, K. R. (2014). Reforming intelligence: The challenge of control in new democracies. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36734213.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 15/11/2021)
• Buchanan, P. G. (5 Mayis 2014). Democratic oversight of intelligence agencies: A primer. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/democratic-oversight-intelligence-agencies-primer (Erişim Tarihi: 15/11/2021)
• Caparini, M. (2016). Democratic control of intelligence services: containing rogue elephants. Routledge.
• Cepik, M. (2017). Bosses and gatekeepers: a network analysis of South America’s intelligence systems. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 30(4), 701-722.
• Cepik, M., & Antunes, P. (2003). Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16(3), 349-373.
• Chopin, O. (2017). Intelligence reform and the transformation of the state: the end of a French exception. Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(4), 532-553.
• Cott, M. (2003). Partisanship and the decline of intelligence oversight. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16(1), 69-94.
• Crosston, M. (2016). Bringing non-Western cultures and conditions into comparative intelligence perspectives: India, Russia, and China. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 29(1), 110-131.
• Dni.gov. (2022). Accountability. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we-work/accountability (Erişim Tarihi: 22/01/2022).
• Edmunds, T. (2008). Intelligence agencies and democratisation: Continuity and change in Serbia after Milošević. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(1), 25-48.
• Eftimiades, N. (1993). China's ministry of state security: Coming of age in the international arena. Intelligence and National Security, 8(1), 23-43.
• Ellis, W. W. (2010). US Intelligence at the Crossroads. Mediterranean Quarterly, 21(2), 1-11.
• Gill, P. (2007). Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK intelligence and security committee and the ‘war on terror’. Intelligence and National Security, 22(1), 14-37.
• Gill, P. (2012). Intelligence, threat, risk and the challenge of oversight. Intelligence and National Security, 27(2), 206-222.
• Hastedt, G. (2010). The Politics of Intelligence Accountability. In The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, Oxford University Press.
• Hayez, P. (2010). “Renseignement”: The new French intelligence policy. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 23(3), 474-486.
• Intelligence.gov (2022). How the IC Works. https://www.intelligence.gov/how-the-ic-works (Erişim Tarihi: 22/01/2022)
• Joffe, A. H. (1999). Dismantling intelligence agencies. Crime, law and social change, 32(4), 325-346.
• Matei, F. C., & Bruneau, T. (2011). Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress. Democratization, 18(3), 602-630.
• Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2013, April 9). US National Intelligence – An Overview 2013. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/193-reports-publications-2013/835-u-s-national-intelligence-an-overview-2013-sponsored-by-the-intelligence-community-information-sharing-executive (Erişim Tarihi: 04/01/2021).
• Ott, M. C. (2003). Partisanship and the decline of intelligence oversight. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16(1), 69-94.
• Pclob.gov. (2022). History and Mission. https://www.pclob.gov/About/HistoryMission (Erişim Tarihi: 22/01/2022).
• Pike, J. (30 Haziran 2020). Canadian Intelligence Agencies. https://fas.org/irp/world/canada/index.html (Erişim Tarihi: 04/01/2021).
• Podbregar, M. F., Anžič, A., & Podbregar, I. (2013). Slovenia's Intelligence Oversight and Audit Experience. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(1), 115-129.
• Shore, J. J. (2006). Intelligence review and oversight in post-9/11 Canada. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(3), 456-479.
• Temiz, S. (2020) Güneydoğu Asya’da terörizm: Endonezya’da Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) Örgütü ve Faaliyetleri, editörler: Hasan Acar, Serkan Yenal, Siyasal Şiddet ve Radikalleşme Bağlamında Terör Örgütleri, Nobel Yayınları, Ankara, 241-267.
• Temiz, S. (2020a). Asya-Pasifik’te Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Güvenliğe Yönelik Politika Geliştirme Mekanizması: ASEAN Bölgesel Forumu, Editor: Hasan Acar, Küresel Terör ve Güvenlik Politikaları, Nobel Yayınları, Ankara, 373-397.
• Wegge, N. (2017). Intelligence Oversight and the Security of the State. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 30(4), 687-700.
• Whitehouse.gov (2022). National Security Council. https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (Erişim Tarihi: 22/01/2022)
• Zegart, A., & Quinn, J. (2010). Congressional Intelligence Oversight: The Electoral Disconnection. Intelligence and National Security, 25(6), 744-766.
• Zybertowicz, A. (2005). An Unresolved Game: The Role of the Intelligence Services in the Nascent Polish Democracy. Who’s watching the spies, 145-159.