Soldiers and The Use of Force: Military Activism and Conservatism During The Intifadas

Abstract

Are soldiers more prone and likely to use force and initiate conflicts than civilians? To bring a new insight to this question, this article compares the main arguments of military activism and military conservatism theories on Israeli policies during the First and Second Intifadas. Military activism argues that soldiers are prone to end political problems with the use of force mainly because of personal and organizational interests as well as the effects of a military-mindset. The proponents of military conservatism, on the other hand, claim that soldiers are conservative on the use of force and it is the civilians most likely offering military measures. Through an analysis of qualitative nature, the article finds that soldiers were more conservative in the use of force during the First Intifadas and Oslo Peace Process while they were more hawkish in the Second Intifada. This difference is explained by enemy conceptions and by the politicization of Israeli officers

Keywords

• Military Activism, Military Conservatism, Use of Force, Israeli Politics, Palestinian Intifada, Civil-Military Relations.

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