The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: On the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II

Abstract

In addition to oral tradition, the knowledge and understanding of history is based on written sources. Therefore it is highly significant when research is able to introduce hitherto unknown material that can shed new light on inveterate truths. This was the case with the study “Finland at the Epicentre of the Storm” by Finnish historian Erkki Hautamäki. The study dealt with the diplomatic prelude to World War II, and was based on a secret dossier by Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim. The dossier was transferred to President J. K. Paasikivi after the war, and then disappeared from public eye. Fortunately, its main items were either copied or a synopsis was made on the request of the Marshal by his long-time trustee, Vilho Tahvanaine. On the basis of these copies, Hautamäki was able to propose an entirely new view of the diplomatic manoeuvring which led to the outbreak of WW II

Keywords

• World War II, Nazi-Soviet relations, Winter War, Eastern Front, Allies’ Diplomacy, the Baltic Countries, British-Soviet Relations.

References

1. Erkki Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä. Marsalka C. G. E. Mannerheimin kansion S-32 salajaiset asjakirjat vuosilta 1932 – 1949. (Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim’s secret dossier from 1932-49) Osa I, Argo Kirjastus, s.a. 2. Ibid., p. 327.
2. Viktor Suvorov, Enesetapp (The Suicide). Olion, Tallinn, 2001, p. 13; the British Foreign Office admits that it has a secret archive which nobody has access to. ”Eesti Päevaleht” www.delfi.ee 22 October 2013.
3. Diplomatitšeskii slovarj v trjoh tomah (Diplomatic Dictionary in 3 volumes). Izdatelstvo polititšeskoi literaturõ, Gl redaktor A.A. Gromõko, Moskva, 1971-1973; 1984-1986.
4. Diplomatitšeskii slovarj, 1973, pp. 238-240, 359, 259-260.
5. Walter (Uolter) Laker, Rossija i Germanija. Nastavniki Gitlera. Perevod s angliiskkogo (Russia and Germany. Teachers of Hitler. Translation from English). Washington, 1991, pp. 208-211. 7. Ibid, p. 212.
6. Eberhard Aleff, Das Dritte Reich (The Tnhird Reich). Edition Zeitgeschehen. Fakelträger 23 Aufl., 1970, pp. 43-44.
7. Laker, Rossija I Germanija, p.220. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä., pp.42-43.
8. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn ssilmässä, pp. 43-44; Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a credit agreement in 1936 in order to facilitate Germany the access to Soviet natural resources and the Soviets access to German industrial production and equipment. The agreement was to run up to 1939 but both parties prolonged its validity. John Plowright, The Causes and Outcomes of World War II. Palgrave, 2007, pp. 65-66.

9. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä., pp. 44-46.
10. Diplomatitšeskii slovarj II, 1986, pp. 258-259.
11. Diplomatitšeskii slovarj III, 1986, pp. 141-145.
12. Mihhail Meltjuhhov, Stalini käestlastud võimalus. Nõukogude Liit ja võitlus Euroopa pärast 1939-1941 (The missed opportunity of Stalin. The Soviet Union and the Fight for Europe 1939-1941). KVı, 2005, p. 40; James C. F. Wang, Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992, p. 88.
13. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä., p. 57. 17. Ibid., p. 61. 18. Ibid., p. 74.
14. Michael Jabera Carley, M. J., Low, Dishonest Decade: Failure of the AngloFranco- Soviet Alliance in 1939” – Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No 2, 1993, p. 315. 20. Ibid., p. 315.
15. Carley, End of the “Low, Dishonest Decade: 321; M. Pankrašova, Anglo-frankosovetskije peregovorõ (British-French-Soviet negotiations)– Meždunarodnaja žižnj, No 8, 1989, pp. 28-39.
16. Pankrašova, Anglo-franko-so vetskije pergovorõ, pp. 28-39.
17. That was also true in respect to economic relations. The volume of the Soviet trade with Germany (especially in imports) in the second half of the 1920s was almost 1.6 times higher than that with Britain.
18. Molotovi-Ribbentropi paktist baaside lepinguni. Dokumente ja materjale. Toimetanud Heino Arumäe (From the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to the agreement on military bases. Documents and materials. Ed: Heino Arumäe), Perioodika, Tallinn, 1989, p. 105.
19. Viktor Suvorov, Denj M. Kogda natšalasj vtoraja mirovaja voina? (Day M. When wa the Second World War started?), “AO “Vsjo dlja Vas”, Moskva, 1994, p.38.
20. Diplomatitšeskii slovarj, T. 3, 1973, pp. 232-234.
21. Lembo Tanning, Euroopa probleem… Teine maailmasõda (The European problem….World War II), OÜ InfotrükkTallinn, 2006, pp. 126-127.
22. Viktor Suvorov, Viimane vabariik (The Last Republic), Olion, 1999, p. 126.
23. Hautamäki, Suomi myrsaakyn silmässä, pp. 129, 173. 30. Ibid., p. 327.
24. Aleff, Das Dritte Reich, p. 182. Another possible reason for revising Hitler’s objective was bad luck which forced the revoking of the “Gelb” plan. The plan fell into the hands of the allies when the aircraft with couriers was intercepted and compelled to land in Belgium on January 9, 1940. A new plan, “Sichelschnitt,” was drawn up and put into operation on May 10, 1940.
25. Andrew Roberts, Hitler and Churchill. Secrets of leadership. Phoenix, 2003, p. 84.
26. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä, p. 152.
27. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä, pp. 165, 170, 173; Douglas Clark, Liittoutuneet lähtevät Talvisodan. Englannin ja Ranskan Suomen-politiika 1939-1940. (British and French Finland Politics in 1939-1940), Helsinki, 1967, p. 187.
28. http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Germany/HitlerMolotov%20 Meetings.htm, p. 11. 36. Ibid., p. 13. 37. Ibid., p. 15. 38. Ibid., p. 23. 39. Ibid., p. 28.
29. Suvorov, Denj M. Kogda natšalasj vtoraja mirovaja voina? , p. 131.
30. Hautamäki, Suomi myrskyn silmässä,, p. 326.
31. The manpower of the Red Army grew from 1.5m in 1938 to 4.2m by January 1, 1941 and to 5.5m by June 21, 1941. In addition to the Red Army there were various and numerous military formations for internal services; see Suvorov, Denj M. Kogda natšalasj vtoraja mirovaja voina?, p. 154.
32. The sensitive foreign policy information could possibly leak from the Cliveden Set which comprised a number of high ranking FO officials who were known by their lenient attitudes towards Germany. In any case it has been alleged that the Germans had