Analysis of the Resource Mobilization Mechanism of the Islamic State

Abstract

This article examines the structure of resource mobilization for the Islamic State by focusing on its recruitment mechanism. This mechanism consists of several actors, and their relationships and interactions are quite important for successful recruitment. Since Islamic extremist organizations need to avoid unreliable members, their resource mobilization in general and recruitment in particular have to be conducted through personal networks, such as kinship networks of each activist. Following the Islamic extremists’ success in agitations and propaganda done in cyber space, changes have appeared in the recruitment mechanism as well. Thus, nowadays, the mechanism is formed by “Muhajirun”, “recruiters”, “coordinators”, “temporary and real accepters”, and “disseminators”. Detailed observations of each actor and their nature, function, and even location reveal several important findings. Furthermore, these findings provide valuable insights about the threat potential of the Islamic State, and of providing counter measures against it. As a consequence, it is possible to say that an effective obstruction of the Islamic State’s resource mobilization is as important as direct military actions or police measures against it

Keywords

• Islamic Extremism, The Islamic State IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh , Resource Mobilization, Mujahidun, Muhajirun, Cross Border Migration, Terrorism.

References

1. Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria, New York, The Soufan Group, 2014, p.33; The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, New York, The Soufan Group, 2015, p. 25.
2. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Recruiter’s Dilemma: Signaling and Rebel Recruitment Tactics”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2013), pp. 3-16.
3. Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s Response, Washington DC, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005; Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, New York, Combating Terrorism Centre, US Military Academy, 2007.
4. Although credibility is not confirmed, the articles below are examples of such information: Hādhihi Hiyā al-Iarīq ilā al-Irāq (“This is the way to Iraq”), at http://www.hkmah.net/ showthread.php?t=8953 (last visited: 4 June, 2005); Iarīq ilā Bilād al-Rāfidayn al-Jadīd (“New way to land of two rivers”), at http://alfirdaws.org/forums/showthread.php?t=2821 (last visited 11 September 2005).
5. In this case the “acceptors” - the Islamic State in Iraq or al-Qaida in the land of Two Rivers-asked the “infiltrators” to declare the amount of money paid for the “coordinators”, and filed it as an organized document. The document suggested that there were no fixed or regular fees for coordination, and suggested the existence of a dispute about the amount of fee the “coordinators” should get (Felter and Fishman, p.23-27).
6. Yutaka Takaoka and Masaki Mizobuchi, “How does Muhajiroun Get to Go to Jihad? Foreign Fighters and the Geopolitics of the Conflict in Syria”, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady (eds.), The Syrian Uprising: roots and trajectories, London, Routledge, 2016 (forthcoming).
7. Carter, Maher and Neumann, Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Network, pp.15-18. 12 Ibid, pp.18-28.
8. Supporters of the Islamic state have compiled several narratives of Muhajirun as e-Books, for example, Hijrah (migration) to the Islamic State 2015, at https://thejihadproject.files. wordpress.com/2015/05/hijrah-to-the-islamic-state.pdf#search=%27Hijrah+to+the+Is lamic+State%27 (last visited 11 October 2016); Although the narratives in this e-book stress the “grace of Allah” or “the will of Allah” for successful journeys, it provides few details of infiltration processes.

9. Neumann, Victims, Perpetrators, Assets, pp.10-11.
10. An article in the Arabic newspaper al-Sharq al-Awasat on 6 November 2014, “Kaifa Yanndamm al-Shābb fī Misr ilā ‘Dā'ish’? (‘How do Egyptian youth join into Da’ish?’)” reported some examples of this reality.
11. Personal data of 122 ISIS suicide bombers, Zaman Al Wasl, at https://en.zamanalwsl. net/news/14563.html (last visited 15 October 2016), showed leaked forms with the personal data of fighters. In addition to name, date of birth and citizenship, etc. the form contains fields of ‘recommendation and recommender’.
12. Takaoka, and Mizobuchi, “How does Muhajiroun Get to Go to Jihad? Foreign Fighters and the Geopolitics of the Conflict in Syria” (forthcoming).
13. General Intelligence and Security Service Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Life with ISIS: the Myth Unravelled, at https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/ aivd-en/documents/publications/2016/01/15/publication-life-with-isis-the-myth- unvravelled/life-with-isis.pdf, pp. 5-13 (last visited 12 October 2016). 19 Ibid, p.14.
14. The Soufan Group estimated that there were only nine Japanese infiltrators into the Islamic State between 2011 and 2015. This fact strongly indicates that there are weak recruitment activities, thus there is only a minor organizational base of the Islamic State in Japan, see, The Soufan Group, p.8.