Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict

Abstract

Over three years after the signing of protocols on opening diplomatic relations and land borders, the prospects for Turkish-Armenian normalisation in the absence of progress on the Karabakh conflict are slim. But there is also little sign of a breakthrough in the Karabakh conflict-resolution process. Given these impasses, this article proposes an alternative way forward: an unconditional opening of Turkish-Armenian diplomatic relations followed by a retooling of the Basic Principles. This retooling would accept a linkage between the border opening and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh. It would also reduce ambiguities in the Basic Principles that have stalled the peace process to date. The article first analyses the failure of the TurkishArmenian protocols, then justifies a change in policy, and finally, proposes a retooled set of interim principles and focuses on intermediate steps that would help normalise ArmenianAzerbaijani relations while deferring the final settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status for a later time

Keywords

• Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, NagornoKarabakh, Minsk Group, Turkey-Armenia normalisation, conflict resolution.

References

1. This article is a revised and updated version of “To Link or Not To Link? Turkey-Armenia Normalization and the Karabakh Conflict”, Caucasus International, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 53-62. The author thanks the editorial board of Caucasus International for their reprint permission.
2. In this article, “Karabakh” refers to all the territories that are the focus of conflict, including the territory of what was known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region) in Soviet times and the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that are presently occupied by Armenian forces. “Nagorno-Karabakh” refers to the territory of the Soviet-era Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.
3. “Turkish PM Sets Conditions to Armenia Reconciliation: Report”, Agence France Presse, 10 April 2009.
4. US Department of State, “Press Statement: Turkey and Armenia: Normalization of Relations”, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/122065.htm [last visited 22 January 2013].
5. ANS TV (Baku), 13 May 2009.
6. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Armenian Foreign Minister H.E. Edward Nalbandian After Their Meeting”, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129687. htm [last visited 12 January 2012].
7. Armenian forces captured a smaller amount of territory, the so-called “Lachin corridor”, outside Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, and additional territories later in the war. For a history of the Karabakh conflict, see, Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York, NYU Press, 2003.
8. “Turk Says Russia is Tangled in Caucasus War”, New York Times, 15 April 1993.

9. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-april-2009_-press- release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa [last visited 28 January 2013].
10. The protocols are available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?93e41cc9-832f-4ec7-a629- a920bfdbb432.
11. See, the two US Department of State statements that opened this article, as well as, “President Serzh Sargsyan met in Prague with the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül”, Office to the President of the Republic of Armenia ,at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/ item/2009/05/07/news-511/ [last visited 03 February 2013].
12. See, for example, Charles Recknagel and Andrew Tully, “Turkey Signals Opening to Armenia Must Include Nagorno-Karabakh Process”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Signals_Opening_To_Armenia_Must_Include_ NagornoKarabakh_Progress/1613844.html [last visited 21 January 2012]; “Turkey Still Committed to Preconditions in Armenia Talks”, Asbarez, at http://asbarez.com/68790/ turkey-%e2%80%98still-committed%e2%80%99-to-armenia-talks-with-preconditions/ [last visited 22 January 2012].
13. See, for example, “Little Fun for Soccer Fans, Giant Leap for Rapprochement”, Today’s Zaman, 13 October 2009.
14. The last publicly available statement of the Basic Principles is the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries”, at http://www.osce.org/item/51152 [last visited 20 January 2013].
15. The text of the constitutional court’s ruling is available at http://www.concourt.am/english/ decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf [last visited 08 January 2013]; The text of Armenia’s declaration of independence is available at http://www.gov.am/en/independence/ [last visited 08 January 2013].
16. “Joint press conference of Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was held”, at http://en.president.az/articles/6053 [last visited 27 December 2012].
17. See, U.S. Department of State, “The U.S. Relationship With Central Europe Under the Obama Administration”, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2011/157707.htm [last visited 12 January 2013]; “The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama Administration”, at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/138446.htm [last visited 12 January 2013].
18. To these justifications might be added two others that could help explain US support for dropping conditionality: responsiveness to domestic lobbying and a possible opportunity to shift the balance of influence in the Caucasus away from Russia and toward the West. These, however, have not been publicly articulated justifications.
19. See, Thomas de Waal, “Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/05/armenia-and-turkey- bridging-gap/22p [last visited 25 January 2013].
20. On the “constructive ambiguity” of the Basic Principles, see, Thomas de Waal, “The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”, Conciliation Resources, December 2008, p. 10.
21. See, for instance, the discussion of “interim status” in, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond Exclusion: Rethinking Approaches to Status in the Nagorno Karabakh Peace Process”, Discussion Paper (February 2012).
22. On problematising the issue of “return” and a discussion of restitution and other alternatives, see Gerard Toal, “Return and its Alternatives: International Law, Norms and Practices, and Dilemmas of Ethnocratic Power, Implementation, Justice and Development” and the other contributions in Forced Displacement in the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Return and its Alternatives, London, Conciliation Resources, August 2011.
23. See, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond Exclusion”, p. 7.