NATO and Russia: A Perpetual New Beginning

Abstract

After a brief period of positive relations between Russia and NATO in the early 1990s, a whole series of crises in relations have led to a general deterioration of the relationship. These crises have resulted from two very different conceptions of self-identity and of the future of security in Europe. Although the divisions became evident already in before the turn of the millennium, the policies of Presidents Putin and Medvedev aimed at rebuilding Russia’s role as a great power contributed further to the divisions. Three areas of NATO policy have been central to Russia’s growing opposition to NATO- expansion eastward, the development of a missile shield, and the globalization of NATO’s involvement. Prospects for a real reconciliation between Russia and NATO are not positive.

Keywords

• Russian foreign policy,Russia-NATO relations,identity and foreign policy,NATO expansion,U.S.-sponsored missile shield,globalization of NATO activity.

References

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4. An excellent recent analysis of NATO and its role in the second decade of the 21st century can be found in Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore (eds.), NATO: In Search of a Vision, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2010.
5. As expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 reads “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”.
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36. The role of the Secretary General has considerably changed since the end of the Cold War from a secondary figure to become the visage of the Alliance. This trend started with SG Manfred Wörner until today. These SGs have contributed to the transformation of this Cold War institution by making it a more political and diplomatic Alliance. The SGs have increased the visibility and influence of the Alliance through the development of global support.
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