Containing the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: The Useful Precedent of a Fuel Swap
Abstract
References
- Portions of this paper draw on the author’s article on “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan”, Survival, Vol.52, No. 3 (June–July 2010), pp. 67–94.
- In theory, a bomb could be made using 20% HEU, but it would be impractically large, weighing at least 400kg. Weapons designers prefer to use HEU enriched to over 90%, which is considered weapons grade.
- IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General”, GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003, pp. 26–28.
- “Ahmadinejad: Iran Ready to Buy N. Fuel from US”, Fars News Agency, at http://english.farsnews. com/newstext.php?nn=8807151645 [last visited 13 October 2010].
- Iran commonly refers to the enrichment level as 20%, which is the rounded-up figure (from 19.75%) used throughout much of the rest of this article.
- IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General”, GOV/2010/46, 6 September 2010, p. 7; The equipment is for the conversion of 20% enriched UF6 to U3O8.
- Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigan, “In Iran, Nuclear Issue is also a Medical One”, Washington Post, 20 December 2009.
- See, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, (June 2006), p. 72.
Details
Primary Language
English
Subjects
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Journal Section
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Authors
Mark Fıtzpatrıck
This is me
Publication Date
October 1, 2011
Submission Date
-
Acceptance Date
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Published in Issue
Year 2011 Volume: 16 Number: 2