PERENNIAL CONFLICT OR EVERLASTING PEACE: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INVOLVEMENT IN CYPRUS

Abstract

It is contended in this paper that the European Union, through the dynamics of the membership accession process, has the potential to contribute to peace and security in and around the island of Cyprus, provided some conditions are met. However, unless the current approach of the EU is changed, the ongoing accession process between the EU and the Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole of Cyprus will lead only to further securitisation in the region. Up to now, the EU has been faced with an impasse whose sources lie in five inter-linked developments. The first stems from the ambiguous strategy of the EU pertaining to the accession of the island. It is one thing to say that the lack of an a priori political settlement on the island would not constitute a precondition for the membership of the Greek Cypriots in the EU as representing the whole island. It is another thing to announce that the EU would approve of whatever a deal the Turkish and Greek Cypriots cut during their inter-communal talks. Due to the ambiguity over the details of the EU’s Cyprus policy, neither community on the island could truly assess the model through which such a membership would come about. Under such an uncertain environment, both communities prefer to stick to their wellestablished negotiation positions, rendering a breakthrough a remote possibility.

References

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5. 5 The point is that changes in foreign policy behaviour of the candidate countries would be more solid and long-lasting if those changes are brought about by a transformation in the identities of those states, rather than the adaptation of their preferences to the conjectural realities. In the second case, deviations from ‘EU-typical foreign policy behaviour’ would be likely in cases where states found it detrimental to conform. For an extensive discussion on these arguments see Thomas Risse and Tanja A. Borzel, ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic Change’, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, No. 2000/56.
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8. 8 Thomas Diez, op. cit.

9. 9 This is implied in the Article 9-b of the EU’s Helsinki Summit Conclusions: “…If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition…” One can reach this text at: < http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm >
10. 10 “…In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” This is the second part of the same article.
11. 11 European Commission President Release: Speech/97/272, 3 December 1997, EU: Van den Brook Speech on Reconciliation in Cyprus.
12. 12 Cyprus: Republic of Cyprus – Gunter Verheugen refers to Cyprus at the Plenary Session of Europe, RDATE: 14/03/2002, Spanish Foreign Minister, Josep Pique, stated that resolution of the Cyprus conflict is not a precondition for EU membership of the island.
13. 13 The text of the European Commission opinion on the Greek Cypriots’ application for EU membership is at
14. 14 The clauses of the EU’s Corfu and Essen Summits on Cyprus are at
15. 15 One can reach this text at the above address.
16. 16 This text is at
17. 17 EU’s Luxembourg Summit conclusions are at
18. 18 EU’s Helsinki Summit conclusions are at
19. 19 The Accession Partnership document prepared for Turkey is at
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21. 21 The text of Denktaş’s confederation proposal is at
22. 22 Osman Ertuğ, ‘The United Nations’ Approach to the Cyprus Issue and UNFICYP’ Perceptions, September-November 2001, pp. 135-146.
23. 23 For instance, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen, recently stated that the European Commission would not accept any dilution of the 1999 EU Helsinki Summit agreement on Cyprus which says a political solution in Cyprus is desirable but not a precondition for membership. See
24. 24 Susanne Baier-Allen, ‘Assessing the Impact of the EU Accession Process on the Cyprus Conflict: Incentive for Conflict Resolution?’ in Susanne Baier-Allen (ed.), Looking into the Future of Cyprus-EU Relations, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1999, pp. 171-186.
25. 25 Tomas Diez, Last Exit to Paradise? The EU, the Cyprus Conflict, and the Problematic ‘Catalytic Effect’, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, June 2000. See also Necati Münir Ertekün, ‘The Turkish Cypriot Outlook’, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: the Need for New Perspectives, London, Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 97-113.
26. 26 Neill Nugent, ‘EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2000, pp. 131-150. See also Kevin Featherstone, ‘Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanisation: Strategic Usage, Structural Transformation and Institutional Adaptation’, South European Society & Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2000, pp. 141-162.
27. 27 This is one of the major arguments of the Euro-sceptics in Turkey. See Erol Manisalı, Avrupa Çıkmazı (The Europe Impasse), Istanbul, Otopsi Yayınları, 2001.
28. 28 Yannis A. Stivahtis, ‘The Enlargement of the European Union: the Case of Cyprus’, International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 2000.
29. 29 Though the mainstream Turkish view puts the blame for the negative Turkish-EU relations on Greece, some authors argue that Greece is only the scapegoat attracting the criticisms of sceptics in Turkish-Greek relations. For example, Mehmet Uğur claims that Greece does not possess the wherewithal to affect the fundamental course of EU-Turkey relations and the main responsibility for the downward spiral in EU-Turkey relations rests with the parties themselves. Because they do not fulfil their obligations arising from the integration process, they find an exit in Greece’s expected anti-Turkish position. Mehmet Uğur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 194-95.
30. 30 Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon, ‘Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis’, National Interest, Issue 66, winter 2001-2002, pp. 83-94. 1
31. 31 Ibid.
32. 32 William Wallace, ‘Reconciliation in Cyprus: The Window of Opportunity’, Mediterranean Program Report in the Framework of the Programme on Support Activities in Connection with Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Its Role as a Key Partner of the EU, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, MP.RM/2002.
33. 33 Barkey and Gordon, op. cit.
34. 34 Wallace, op. cit.
35. 35 Ibid.
36. 36 This should not be difficult to realise given that neither of the contracting parties to the 1960 treaties proclaimed that these are invalid.
37. 37 Zeliha Khashman, “Is Federal Structure an Appropriate Political Solution for Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Cyprus” Perceptions, Vol. IV, No. 2.
38. 38 Hansjorg Berg, ‘Turkey and the Cyprus Question’, International Spectator, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, 1999, pp. 111-21. See also Clement H. Dodd, ‘Cyprus in Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy’, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, London, Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 28-147.
39. 39 Patrick R. Hugg, ‘Cyprus Advances Towards Europe: Realism and Rationalism’, Perceptions, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2001, pp. 92-111.
40. 40 For example, the Belgian model of federalism, which is based on equality between the constituent parts and the central government, is strongly recommended for Cyprus. Besides, regulations concerning the Aaland Islands, a Swedish-speaking Finnish territory, are put up as a model before the Cypriot communities. Regulations concerning the rights of other EU citizens to buy property in Poland, Denmark and Malta can constitute other role models for Cyprus. On the compatibility between the EU accession of the island and the solution of the Cyprus dispute, see Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean: Shaping EU Accession and Re-Unification Together, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2002.