THE POLITICS OF CASPIAN REGION ENERGY RESOURCES: A CHALLENGE FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Abstract

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian region, with its rich hydrocarbon reserves, assumed great significance in the energy politics of the regional states and the global actors. Coupled with the landlocked nature of the Caspian region, the development of trans-national export pipelines to transport oil and gas from the Caspian caused competition both between companies over the contracts and between states over the final export routes. The high stakes led to the struggle being labeled the ‘New Great Game’, the main actors of which are the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan , Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey and some international oil firms

References

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34. Experts confirm that the underlying reason behind such support relates to the corporate interests of Chevron for a gas deal with Turkey, which has a considerable domestic demand for gas. In terms of its domestic energy needs, Turkey needs to import gas 45bn cm in 2005, 55bn cm in and 82bn cm in 2020.
35. Exploration-development-transportation-distribution-marketing. N. Pamir, 2001, op. cit., p. 5.